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ABSTRACT
Given that the Cold War has ended, the utility and future form of
Finnish and Swedish nonalignment/neutrality policies is open to debate.
Nonalignment may continue to be a practical impediment to these
countries' involvement in Pan-European political, economic, and security
organizations such as the European Community and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The proximity of Sweden and Finland
to the Soviet Union, and in particular to the strategic assets on the Kola
Peninsula also will be a factor in future Nordic security decisions. If
Sweden and Finland remain outside the collective European framework, the
United States will have to recognize the distinct nature of Nordic policy
and negotiate bilaterally to ensure continued access to its interests in the
High North.
This thesis examines the foreign policy challenges facing the
Scandinavian neutrals in the 1990s. To that end, four sub-topics are
analyzed: the development of neutrality in international law and its
impact on modern foreign policy; historical inputs in Swedish and Finnish
national interest; regional interests which affect policy decision-making;
and, Swedish/Finnish interests in the evolving European order. The
concluding sections provide an appraisal of U. S. strategic interests in the
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1. INTRODUCTION
Swedish and Finnish foreign policies are at a crossroads. Easing
Cold War tensions brought on by the extraordinary changes in East and
Central Europe are creating a new, as yet unknown, European order.
Although on the periphery of the political and economic confusion facing
Central Europe, Scandinavia is nevertheless affected by these changes.
There is already significant political, security, and economic fallout from
the 'opening of the East' and the unification of Germany. The impact that
these consequences have on the unique regional issues will continue to
dominate Swedish and Finnish policy in the short term. The cultural and
ideological links between the Scandinavian NATO countries, Denmark,
Iceland, and Norway, and the armed neutrals, Sweden and Finland,
traditionally have been important factors in regional policymaking. This
so-called 'Nordic Balance'" likely will readjust to accommodate the Soviet
Union's 'new thinking' in foreign policy. Similarly, if as predicted, NATO
evolves to become primarily a 'political' alliance as the Warsaw Pact
itself dissolves, the Nordic states will have to reconsider the new
regional power balance minus the element of superpower competition. The
proximity of Sweden and Finland to the Soviet Union, and in particular to
the strategic assets on the Kola Peninsula nevertheless will remain a
factor in future Nordic security decisions. So long as the countries are
outside of the collective European framework, the United States will have
1Also referred to in recent reports as 'Nordic Stability' to assuage Soviet concerns
regarding against whom the region was balanced.
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to recognize the distinct nature of Nordic policy and negotiate bilaterally
to ensure continued access to its interests in the High North.
Sweden, a well-armed neutral at the core of the 'Nordic Balance,' has
not been immune from the dramatic changes to the East and South.
Swedish security policy in the 1990s should reflect the Realpolitik of the
region. principal concerns for the Swedes remain relatively constant
despite the turmoil unleashed by perestroyka. The country must still look
to regional stability as the primary means of ensuring Swedish security.
Toward this end, the Swedes should monitor closely Soviet capabilities
and intentions in the High North, the evolving nature of the North Atlantic
alliance and its impact on Danish and Norwegian security, and the effect
of the European Community union on Swedish economic concerns.
Additionally, even though Sweden's reliance on nonalignment has served
the country well for more than 175 years, dogmatic belief in the policy as
an end in itself should be avoided. As the industrial countries of Western
Europe close ranks in preparation for EC1992 and focus their energies and
financial resources on the East, Sweden simply could be left waving the
neutral banner in economic isolation. The Swedish parliament's recent
decision tr apply for membership in the European Community in 1993 is a
significant step toward realizing the benefits of economic and political
integration with the continent. If it wishes to maintain its self-
appointed position as the 'moral conscience' of Western ideology, Sweden
will be forced to look carefully at the means to ensure its voice is heard
in continental and global affairs.
Like the Swedes, the Finns should continue to use the 'Nordic Balance'
as the central element of their regional policy. Toward this end, the Finns
should pay close attention to several potential trouble spots requiring
2
foreign policy initiative: Soviet military capabilities and intentions in
the High North; the fate of the Baltic states and the Karelia ASSR; the
North Atlantic alliance and its impact on Danish and Norwegian security;
the evolution of the European Community and the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and, continental environmental issues.
None of these areas will wait for action by the conservative Finnish
leadership. Sweden's surprise move to apply for EC membership surely
will impact Helsinki's view of its function in the European Free Trade
Association and subsequently, the efficacy of Nordic non-alignment. With
the prospect of Moscow's ability to influence Finland waning, the time is
right for the country to chart a new course on the political and economic
map of Europe.
The governments of Sweden and Finland are facing a paradigm shift in
the conduct of regional, continental and global relations. The end of the
Cold War has freed the states' foreign policies from self-imposed caution.
However, to sit back and enjoy the impressive economic and political
gains achieved in th last half century would be a near-sighted mistake
for the Swedes and Finns, and one they are not likely to make. The
13adership must be poised to confront the challenges of their role in the
new paradigm and to approach their Soviet and European partners with
prudent optimism. For Sweden and Finland, the question remains, what
will be the benefit, or even purpose, of neutrality and nonalignment?
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II. NEUTRALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
Neutrality as either the goal or the means of foreign policy did not
develop independently in international judicial fora. Rather, neutrality
evolved as a product of war. Throughout the history of warfare, there
have been groups, with diverse motivations, that have tried to stay clear
of the belligerent factions. More often than not, the neutrals' middle of
the road policies have been scorned by both warring parties. Machiavelli
described neutrality as a tenuous and potentially dangerous foreign policy
position: "The conqueror does not want doubtful friends who do not help
him when he is in difficulties; the loser repudiates you because you were
unwilling to go arm in hand, and throw in your lot with him." 2 The Italian
political philosopher's precept - perhaps more notable in the modern
phrase 'whoever is not with us must be against us' - elucidates the
neutrals' dilemma.
Therein lies the paradox of neutrality. What rational and principled
leadership would not respect the moral claim of a state to refute violence
as a means to solve conflict? A nation in the middle of war, however, may
see neither the logic nor the desirability of a potential ally's non-
commitment. When vital interests - perhaps even national sovereignty -
are at stake, the state threatened (particularly when it is the object of an
aggression) is unlikely to ignore, much less support, the neutrals' claim to
the moral high ground. 3 At a minimum, the neutral is viewed as
2 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London: Penguin Books, 1982), 121.
3 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (New York: Routledge, 1988), 1.
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hypocritical - perhaps even immoral - in attempting to avoid the horrors
of war while seeking to benefit from its outcome.
Consequently, the evolution of neutrality has caused much debate as
to its surrounding theory, practice, and international legitimacy. This
section will review the general currents of the debate. The first part
examines the historical development of neutrality policy, while the
second will discuss the modern definition of the concept and its practice
in the latter half of the twentieth century.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF NEUTRALITY
References to neutral states are recorded at least as far back as the
fourth century B.C. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides
writes of two incidents illustrative of the precarious relationship
between war and neutrality while relating the potential extremes in
outcome. The first addresses the concept of reciprocal rights and
responsibilities of neutrals and belligerents, an idea initially based on a
convergence of mutual interests. Corcyra, a small insular state,
requested that Athens, one of the two great powers and undisputed master
of the sea, remain neutral in the Corcyroean's conflict with Corinth. The
Corcyroean envoys petitioned the Athenians not to allow Corinthians or
Corcyroeans to recruit troops from its territory. 4 This type of mutual
understanding between states guaranteeing a neutral's position in
wartime was not codified in international convention until centuries
later, however, and as the second incident illustrates, the rights of
4Thucydides, Histoty of the Peloponnesian War, trans. M. I. Finley jLondon: Penguin
Books, 1972), 53-67.
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neutrality and sovereignty remained at the mercy of the military powers.
Thucydides, in the "Melian Dialogue," describes the conflict between
Athens and Melos, a neutral island-state. Melos had maintained its
neutrality during the first fifteen years of the Peloponnesian War; Athens,
as the great sea power, viewed it a sign of weakness to allow a small
insular state to remain other than a subject or an ally. In the ensuing
dialogue, the Athenian envoys succinctly stated their demands to the
Melians: submit to Athens or be destroyed. In a statement that captures
the practical difficultie :f a foreign policy protected solely by its
morality, the Athenians bluntly declared: "The standard of justice depends
on the equality of power to compel.... (T)he strong do what they can, and
the weak accept what they must."5
While the argument for 'might is right' prevalent in Thucydides'
account has plagued history, attempts to codify the rights and obligations
of belligerents and neutrals began to show signs of limited success in the
Middle Ages. Clauses included in international conventions in the
fourteenth century demonstrated a greater readiness on the part of
belligerents to recognize the right of certain states to remain 'fence-
sitters.' The best known case of the early a~tempts to specify neutrality
in international law was the Consolato del mare of maritime law,
regarding neutrals' rights at sea.6 Nevertheless, the extent and form of
neutrality remained for individual states to decide since there existed no





Not until the seventeen century did a guide to neutrals' behavior find
its way into international law. Hugo Grotius, in "On the Law of War and
Peace" (De jure belli et pacis ), outlined the decision-making and policy
conduct for the neutral. According to Grotius, neutrals had the obligation
to discriminate between the just and the unjust factions in war, and they
were required to make a value judgement for each case threatening a
state's neutrality. There were two possibilities for the neutral in Grotius'
theory: either (1) the just party was readily identifiable or (2) the
neutral could not determine the just belligerent without doubt.7 In the
first case, the neutral state should do nothing to the detriment of the just
party, while alternatively the actions of the neutral should avoid
enhancing the position of the unjust faction. If an unequivocal value
judgment could not be made, then the neutral state was obligated to treat
both belligerents equally, and to avoid actions benefitting one party to the
detriment of the other. Neutrality, in Grotius' view, was a dynamic policy,
with decisions of impartiality made for each conflict only after a careful
review of the moral positions of each warring faction. Unfortunately, the
philosopher did not reveal either how the determination of justness should
be made or who would have the indisputable right to assign the judgement.
Since no supra-national body to resolve such conflicts existed as yet in
the seventeenth century, the task of determining Grotius' form of
conditional neutrality remained with the individual state.
7Hugo Grotius, "On the Law of War and Peace," in The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in
the Twentieth Century, ed. R. Ogley (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970), 34-35. Also
Karsh, p. 14-15 for an interpretation of Grotius' resolution of the judgement of just and
unjust.
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The next two hundred years showed rapid progress toward developing
an international consensus for neutrality as interstate commerce grew and
national borders were better defined. A noted eighteenth century
jurisprudent, Vattel, recognized the necessity to strictly define the
obligations of the neutral. From his studies, Vattel structured the principle
of impartiality and defined the role of the neutral in wartime as "those who
take no one's part, remaining friends common to both parties, and not
favouring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of the other."8 Still,
Vattel's view was not the final word on impartiality. On the one hand, in
many cases 'neutral' states continued to favor one belligerent over another,
while the success of a small state's neutrality remained almost wholly
dependent on the current military balance of power.
As the century progressed, however, the practical observance of
neutral rights and obligations evolved. Neutrals tended to be less partial
in their dealings with the belligerents, employing Vattel's principles
except in cases of prior treaty commitments. Concurrently, the neutral
states began to take steps to guarantee their third-party status through
armed neutrality and collective defense. The first concrete step in this
direction came in 1780-3 with the union of nine proclaimed neutrals in
'The League of Armed Neutrality.' 9 Formed at the height of the American
War of Independence against England, the League presented a list of
concrete demands in order to guarantee their right to free commerce.
8 H. Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim's International Law (London: Longmans,1965) vol II,
653-4.
9The agreement which brought together the League was signed in 1780 with the following
countries as signatories: Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Prussia, Holland, Austria
(joined in 1781), and Portugal and Sicily (joined in 1783).
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Along with the demands, the signatories declared their willingness and
intent to use force if necessary to ensure compliance, albeit realizing
that in doing so they would be fighting the war they had hoped to avoid.
The 'Second League of Armed Neutrality,' founded in 1800, was
generally similar to its predecessor. Like the first League, the new union
was formed to defend neutral rights against the belligerents - in the form
primarily of protecting maritime commerce from the reaches of the Royal
Navy. Neither League represented a long-term coalition of neutrals nor
was it particularly successful in defending the interests of the
signatories. Nevertheless, the principles observed in the unions'
conventions served as the basis for the wide-ranging Declaration of Paris
(signed 16 April 1856) which established the rules of warfare under
maritime law. Secondly, the Leagues set the precedent for an 'active'
neutrality whereby neutrals serve to protect themselves from
belligerents by all means available - including force, if necessary. Lastly,
the practical significance of the Leagues' actions was the international
dismissal of Grotius' value judgement theory and prejudiced neutrality in
favor of Vattel's principle of impartiality.
A major milestone in the practical development of neutrality was the
American Declaration of Neutrality in the wars following the French
Revolution. In 1793, President George Washington declared that "the duty
and interest of the United States requires that they should, with sincerity
and good faith, adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards
the belligerent powers."lo The notable point of Washington's statement is
10 Nils Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality (London: Frank Cass, 1971), 18. Orvik hasbeen a prolific writer on Norwegian foreign policy and security affairs. Consequently, his
arguments reflect a certain bias toward Norway's rough ride from neutrality to alignment.
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the emphasis on the obligation of the neutral and the strict interpretation
of nonalignment. The Declaration would lead nineteen years later to an
American war with Britain over the rights of neutrals and freedom of
navigation and the obligations of belligerents vis . vis those rights,
culminating finally in the U. S. Neutrality Act of 1818. The willingness of
the newly-formed American government both to commit - in official
terms - its foreign policy means to neutrality and subsequently to go to
war to defend those interests provided the most significant impetus to
date for international recognition of neutrals.
Individual state legislation, as in the American case, was not
sufficient to properly define the behavior of neutrals and belligerents.
Prior to World War I, there were three attempts to redress this gap. The
Congress of Vienna took the first active step through proclamations of
'guaranteed' neutrality. For example, in 1815 the Great Powers conferred
on Switzerland their permanent recognition of that state's neutral
status." The European leaders agreed to
authentically recognize that the neutrality and inviolability of
Switzerland and her independence of all foreign influence are in the
true interest of the policy of Europe as a whole.12
11 Switzerland was recognized by the Congress in 1815 as a neutral state, guaranteeing its
territorial integrity in the event of future hostilities. Belgium (1839) and Luxembourg(1867) also were granted neutral status. Unfortunately for the latter countries, their
position as buffer states would betray them in the Great Power struggles of the twentieth
century.
12Claudio Caratsch and Luzius Wildhaber, "The Permanent Neutrality of Switzerland," in
Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe, Karl E. Bimbaum and Hanspeter Neuhold, eds.
(Laxenburg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1982), 18. See also Richard A.
Bitzinger, Neutrality for Eastern Europe? An Examination of Possible Western Role
Models (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,1990), 3.
10
As mentioned above, the next attempt to institutionalize neutrality was
the Declaration of Paris in 1856.13 Certain clauses of the Declaration
dealt with maritime commerce and for the first time set in international
treaty rules governing the right of neutrals to ship belligerents' goods
other than contraband.
Not until the international conference called at The Hague in 1899
was the spectrum of neutral rights and obligations vis J vis belligerents
discussed as an aspect of international law. It was another eight years,
at the Second Hague Conference of 1907, that the resulting document was
agreed upon and signed into international treaty. The final product - the
Hague Convention V, dealing with land warfare and the Hague Convention
XIII, which built on the Declaration of Paris sections concerning war at
sea - is regarded still as the basis for modern interpretations of
neutrality. 14  At this point it is worth noting that although neutrality-
based foreign policies met with varied success in the two world wars of
the twentieth century, principles defined in international law have
remained valid and in fact have been bolstered by post-war peace treaties,
a host of international conventions (including the Geneva Convention in
1949), and the United Nations.
13The Declaration followed the Paris Conference which determined the peace arrangements
of the Crimean War.
14Karsh, 19. Also Joseph H. Choate, The Two Hague Conferences (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1913).
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B. MODERN NEUTRALITY DEFINED
Modern examples of neutrality are limited to what has been termed
the European model. There are five European states which follow the
principles of neutrality as outlined above: Ireland, Austria, Switzerland,
Sweden, and Finland. While there exist similarities in the practice of
neutrality among all of the states, the list can be divided into three
groups. First, Ireland stands alone as an unarmed neutral and is the only
self-proclaimed nonaligned country to hold membership in the European
Community. The second group, Switzerland and Sweden, are countries
with a long history of neutrality/nonalignment; both maintain a strong
defense force and have remained free of belligerent intervention since the
Napoleonic Wars. Austria and Finland represent the third grouping. Both
states maintain military forces, but their foreign and defense policies
have been tempered to varying degrees by post-Second World War treaties
with the Soviet Union - the FCMA (discussed below) in the case of Finland,
and the State Treaty for Austria. A further difference between the last
two categories of neutrals is that perhaps whereas for Switzerland and
Sweden neutrality is an 'expression of sovereignty,' in Austria and Finland
it has become the 'instrument of sovereignty.'15 For purposes of this
study, succeeding sections will explore exclusively the Swedish and
Finnish cases.
Neutral countries will define neutrality as best suits their national
interests. The common denominator for neutrals' obligations, however,
has remained constant since the late eighteenth century: that principle,
1 5Bitzinger, 7.
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as discussed above, is the idea of impartiality. The international jurist
Oppenheim refined the principle to include a definition of neutrality as "an
attitude of impartiality adopted by third states towards belligerents."' 6
Alternatively, the Hague Conferences established in international law the
obligations of belligerents vis A vis neutral states. Requirements under
Conventions V and XIII include:
In land war -- belligerents are forbidden to violate the territorial
integrity of the neutral state; this prohibition includes the
transportation of troops, weapons and supply convoys through neutral
territory, instalment (sic) of any kind of communications facility in the
territory of the neutral state, or the use of facilities existing in that
state for military purposes, as well as the recruitment and
establishment of military units on the neutral state's territory.
In the sphere of naval warfare - belligerents are forbidden to carry out
any action which violates the sovereignty of the neutral state, such as
acts of war within the state's territorial waters and the use of its
ports and waters as operational bases against enemies. The provision is
to be applied on the broadest possible basis, including even indirect
uses of neutral territorial waters and ports for purposes of resupply, as
well as exploitation of existing communications facilities.17
While the nuts and bolts details of international convention regarding
neutrality have been stressed and violated more than once in the
twentieth century, the underlying principles have survived remarkably
intact. The longevity of a neutral foreign policy may be understood best
through what Efraim Karsh calls the benefits of 'permanent neutrality;"18
16 Lauterpacht, 655.
171bid., in interpretation of Hague Conventions V (articles 1-4) and XI11 (articles 2 and
5).
1 8 11d., 21-63.
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a small state will remain neutral in peacetime for either or both of two
reasons: first, the state's foreign policy is guided by moral concerns
which prohibit the use or support of violence as a means of policy; and/or
secondly, the state which is nonaligned in peacetime is making its
commitment to wartime neutrality known to the international community.
This latter policy, or permanent neutrality, is the basis for the European
Model noted previously, and accurately reflects the post-war behavior of
the two Nordic nonaligned states.
One final definition which concerns this study is that of
'neutralism. ' 19 A phenomena of the Cold War era, the term is often
confused with permanent neutrality, with which it is only nominally
related. Neutralism refers to a peacetime policy of nonalignment vis J vis
the superpowers. While advocating a middle-of-the-road approach to
international affairs, neutralism does not obligate the state to the
restrictions of permanent neutrality nor does the nonaligned policy mean
that the state has renounced the use of force to settle disputes. The Third
World states which proclaimed nonaligned status in the 1960s and 70s are
examples of the neutralism-based foreign policies.
Swed-n and Finland, the two Scandinavian states which remained
nonaligned following the Second World War, fall into the category of
permanent neutrality. As will be discussed below, the countries'
peacetime foreign policies reflect the embodiment of the international
19Websters dictionary defines neutralism as "the policy, or advocacy of a policy, of
remaining neutral, especially in international power conflicts. Karsh, among others,
equates neutralism with nonalignment.
14
principles of neutrality, including a broad adherence to the obligations and
a determined pursuit of their rights as neutrals.
15
III. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
It would be to understate the intertwined nature of the Nordic
relationship to declare merely that Swedish and Finnish foreign policies
draw on the past. Administrative ties between the two nations can be
traced back nearly ni.ie hundred years. For seven centuries Finland was an
autonomous region in the Kingdom of Sweden. Their armies have fought
aggressors from the south - the Danes and Germans - and, since Peter the
Great, from the east. Nonetheless, the Swedes and Finns have retained a
unique combination of nationalism and regionalism, sharing a common
cultural and philosophical identity.20  Whereas in casual analysis, it
might appear that their leaders exercise excessive restraint in the
conduct of contempory foreign policy, in reality, the Swedes and the Finns
draw from a proven background of lessons learned. Consequently,
understanding the nature of Swedish and Finnish decisionmaking requires
a review of the historical development of national interests.
A. SWEDEN
1. 1814-1945: The Efficacy of Armed Neutrality
Since 1814 and the end of the Napoleonic wars, Swedish foreign
policy has been based on nonalignment. Unlike Switzerland, where
neutrality is observed by international convention, or Finland and Austria,
20Theodore L. Stoddard and others, Finland: A Country Study (Washington: The American
University, 1985), 159. The Finns are ethnically different from the other Nordic
peoples. While Swedish and Norwegian are Indo-European based languages, Finnish is a
Finno-Ugrian language. The Finns, therefore, share common roots with the Estonians and
the Hungarians.
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where the terms are conditioned by agreement with a powerful neighbor,
Sweden's armed neutrality is self-imposed. The term 'neutrality,' as used
to describe Sweden's peacetime foreign policy, is actually a misnomer.
The country's declared posture is alliansfrihet - or 'freedom from
alliances' - a stance designed to ensure Sweden's ability to proclaim
neutrality in wartime. 2 1 The Swedish alliansfrihet applies only to
security policy and not to cultural or ideological aspects. Politically,
economically, and socially, Sweden is a modern Western democracy with
an extensive and effective social welfare system. Government off;-ials
are quick to point out that the neutrality policy is not an end in itseif, but
rather one option among many designed to ensure that the country's
territorial integrity and political sovereignty are maintained.
In this century, Swedish nonalignment and neutrality policies have
been tested time and again. Sweden, as well as Norway and Denmark,
remained neutral in World War 1.22 The ability of the Scandinavians to
stay clear of the continental hostilities is owed more to geostrategic
reasons than to any particular respect on the part of the belligerents for
Nordic 'armed neutrality.' Under pressure from Berlin, Denmark in fact
mined the Baltic Straits, thereby ensuring the de facto defense of
Germany's northern flank.23 Nonetheless, the Nordic states emerged from
WWI with their neutrality and sovereignty intact and their economies free
from the ravages of war.
2 1Joseph Kruzel, "New Challenges for Swedish Security Policy," Survival,
November/December 1988, 530-1.
22Finland remained a province of Russia until 1918.
23Gregory Flynn, ed., NATO's Northern Allies (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 61.
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The general spirit of relief and hope in Europe that the continent
had just survived the 'war to end all wars' likewise infected Scandinavia.
The Swedes looked to the newly-formed League of Nations as the
acceptable means of collective security for the new European order. With
the global economic boom of the 1920s and in the absence of a well-
defined threat, Sweden's future was secure, if not extremely promising.
The nation watched the small national defense forces shrink steadily in
the interwar years, as the government enthusiastically supported the
collective defense efforts of the League and shifted budget priority to
domestic social concerns. The other Nordic countries responded similarly
in the aftermath of the war. Regional disarmament became even more
pronounced with the economic downturn beginning in the late 1920s.
Governments were forced to sharply cut defense expenditures to pay for
mushrooming social programs mandated during the financial boom. 2 4
Consequently, when it became apparent in the 1930s that the security
apparatus of the League of Nations was unable to stem the tide of fascist
expansionism, Sweden and its Nordic neighbors realized that they could do
little to muster an effective self-defense. 25
The Soviet incorporation of the Baltir- states in 1939 and the
'Winter War' with the Finns (discussed in detail below) brought the
security threat to Sweden's doorstep. Concluding the partition of Poland
with Hitler, Stalin consolidated his strategic hold on the Baltic rim. When
the German forces occupied Denmark and Norway in the Spring of 1940,
2 41bid.
25Rodney Kennedy-Minott, Lonely Path to Follow: Nonaligned Sweden, United
States/NATO, and the USSR (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 3.
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Sweden was left as the only unscathed neutral in the region. Much to the
disheartenment of its neighbors, Sweden offered little in the way of
military support, opting instead to negotiate with the belligerents in
order to buy time to re-build its armed forces depleted in the twenty
years between world wars. In the interim, Swedes offered asylum to
thousands of Danish Jews fleeing Nazi subjugation and provided sanctuary
for Norwegian resistance fighters. At the same time, Sweden traded
steadily with the Nazis until 1944 and provided rail services to German
troops and supplies enroute to southern Norway. In the end, as in the First
World War, Sweden was spared more through a 'flexible' foreign policy and
a fortunate geostrategic position than by an effective armed deterrent.
As one American commentator described Sweden's World War Two
balancing act:
Contrary to postwar popular opinion in the West, Swedish leaders of
the period were under no illusions that Sweden's policy of
nonalignment in peace and neutrality in war had "saved" it. The
Swedes dexterously walked a compromisingly crooked line, zigging
and zagging diplomat'cally while building up very large military
forces to ensure credibility.2 6
The strategic lessons learned from the Second World War would alter
the context of regional security policy for the remainder of the century.
The Danes, Finns, and Norwegians realized that their national military
means were insufficient to deter a larger, better equipped force and
that neutrality meant little to a brutal aggressor bent on continental (or
regional) domination. For their part, the Soviets learned from the Allied
2 6 1bid., 5.
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re-supply convoys on the 'Murmansk Run' the strategic value of the
northern waters to the defense of the northern flank and for control of
trans-Atlantic shipping.
2. The Cold War Challenge
In the aftermath of the Second World War, many Scandinavians
hoped that the United Nations - with more 'bite' than the defunct League
of Nations - would function as an international peace-keeping body
capable of protecting their neutrality.27 However, by 1947, worsening
Soviet-American relations and the emergence of a 'full blown' Cold War
demonstrated the inadequacies of the security arm the UN. With hopes
for a peaceful international order shattered, Sweden, Norway, and
Denmark initiated talks on the formation of the Scandinavian Defense
Union (SDU). The purpose of the SDU would be to protect the security
interests of the three nonaligned/neutral Nordic countries.28 While
Sweden and Denmark wholly supported the plan, Norway was reticent.
The Norwegians doubted that Sweden, as the largest and most powerful
of the Scandinavian countries, could provide the necessary amounts of
equipment and reinforcements to defend effectively regional interests.
Norway saw the U.S. as the most reliable source of support in time of
crisis and proposed a plan for the SDU to form a loose connection with
the Atlantic Alliance. Sweden found Norway's position unacceptable to
its traditional posture of nonalignment and refused to consider any
security ties to the West. Once the proposal was formally rejected, the
27Richard A. Bitzinger, Denmark, Norway, and NATO: Constraints and Challenges (Santa
Monica: Rand Corporation,1989), 9.
2 8 Finland was negotiating the terms of peace with the Allies during this period and in fact
still faced occupation by Soviet troops in some regions.
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Norwegians dropped out of the SDU talks and began negotiations to join
the U.S.-West Europe security net. Denmark continued to press for a
bilateral agreement with Sweden. Without the Norwegians, the Swedes
believed that the SDU would be both impractical and impotent, and in
the end, it was Stockholm that finally ended negotiations on a
Scandinavia-only defense league. Denmark, isolated and without a
credible deterrent, joined the Atlantic alliance by default.2 9
Although both Norway and Denmark abandoned their failed
policies of minimally-armed neutrality, Sweden emerged from World
War Two determined that nonalignment would allow maximum freedom
of political maneuver in the Cold War era. Guided by Osten Ud6n, Foreign
Minister from 1945 to 1962, Swedish foreign policy focused on 'active
neutrality.' 30 Ud~n, considered to be the prime architect of Sweden's
revised nonalignment posture, sought a greater international role for
his country, a position that would entail moral as well as pragmatic
aspects. The country's wartime conduct and its subsequent
nonalignment were declared to be 'morally correct.' As one Swedish
diplomat noted, a policy of neutrality does not limit Swedes to a
'neutrality of opinion.' 3 1 The moralistic and vocal opinions coming from
Stockholm have given cause for much irritation in the U.S. in the last
four decades. A long series of Social Democratic Party governments
have found much to fault in U.S. foreign policy, including a superpower
strategy rooted in Mutually Assured Destruction, and military activities




in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Since the
immediate aftermath of World War Two and following the Fenno-Soviet
defense agreement and the American alliance with Denmark and Norway,
Sweden has viewed with much concern superpower intentions in the
Nordic region. Consequently, Stockholm has been quick to protest any
attempt by the superpower blocs to escalate tensions in Northern
Europe while carefully observing its self-defined nonalignment posture.
3. Submarine Intrusions and Credible Response
The most direct threat to Sweden's policies of nonalignment and
armed neutrality since WWll have been the Soviet Navy's repeated
violations of Swedish territorial waters. Sightings of 'alien'
submarines have been reported at irregular intervals since the early
1960s. In the 1980s the frequency of sightings increased markedly as
the submarine operations directed at Sweden became much more
aggressive. The first confirmation that the intruders were Soviet came
in October 1981 when a Whiskey-class submarine (U-137) grounded
itself in the coastal waters off Karlskrona, a major Swedish naval
installation in the country's southwest.32 Many Swedes were outraged
at so obvious a violation of their territorial integrity, although some
found humor that the Soviets were caught flagrante delicto. When the
government pressed the Soviets for an explanation, Moscow's official
statement claimed that the submarine "was on an ordinary training
cruise in the Baltic" when "it strayed off course in poor visibility." The
response was hardly believable given the extreme difficulty of
32 Gordon H. McCormick, Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish
Waters (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,1990), 4. Kennedy-Minott and Kruzel both
present detailed descriptions of Soviet submarine operations.
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negotiating the treacherous waters of the coastal archipelago to the
point that U-137 had penetrated. Relations between Moscow and
Stockholm worsened further when the Swedes detected the presence of
Uranium-238, most likely associated with nuclear-tipped torpedoes,
aboard the grounded Soviet vessel.33
Contrary to what might have been expected, the number of
confirmed sightings of unidentified submarines increased considerably
in the following year. In the Fall of 1982, multiple foreign submarines
were sighted deep within the waters of Harsfjarden, near the nation's
largest naval base and shipyard. The resulting anti-submarine warfare
operation lasted from 1 October to 1 November and was the largest such
search ever conducted by the Swedish Navy.34 Subsequent analysis has
shown that multiple 'alien' submarines did enter the Harsfjarden area in
early October and may have returned in mid- to late November following
the end of the initial ASW search operations. Swedish efforts to force
the intruders to surface included extensive use of depth charges,
although rules of engagement in force at the time prevented local
commanders from destroying the contacts. In the end, the intruders
evaded Swedish Navy forces and escaped into international waters. In
1983, an unclassified report by a parliamentary commission concluded
that there were at least six submarines involved in the incursion. Three
of these were believed to be mini-subs used by Soviet special
33 1bid., 7. U-238 is used as a jacket for the nuclear warhead. Regarding the grounding,
one Soviet diplomat hinted that the submarine's crew had been celebrating a successful
exercise in the southern Baltic and were in fact drunk - a dubious claim again considering




operations forces (Spetsnaz ), at least one of which was of the type
that can 'crawl' along the seafloor. Track and keel impressions
indicated that one submarine penetrated as far as the Port of
Stockholm. 35
The 'Harsfjarden Incident' attracted wide press coverage, not
only in Sweden but throughout Europe as well. Considering the serious
international political consequences for the Soviet Union, the reasoning
behind the violations of Swedish waters has caused great debate among
Western analysts. One theory suggests that the Soviets have had a
political motive: Sweden, while proclaiming nonalignment, actually is
too pro-Western for Moscow's tastes; the submarine incursions are a
"calculated attempt to frighten the Swedish government into assuming a
more balanced political posture" between East and West. 36 Some in
Sweden argue that NATO is responsible for the operations, while others
suggest that the incursions are nothing more than an elaborate diversion
from the Soviet's primary wartime objective, Norway's North Cape.37
According to the 1983 Swedish Defense Commission report, however,
the most probable basis for the Soviet operations were 'military
operational objectives,' such as the testing of new technologies, probing
of Western defense systems, and "reconnaissance in Swedish territorial
waters as part of a larger plan for the possibility of a superpower






operational contingencies for the Soviets. In any case, the U-137
incident quietly put to rest the domestic political pundits who had
argued that the navy's 'submarines' were merely budget ghosts in an
attempt to scare up more defense appropriations.
Submarine intrusions have continued unabated at least through
Autumn of this year.39 Considering Soviet President Gorbachev's
determined effort to convince the West of Moscow's 'new thinking,'
these repeated violations of international law must have some
significant objective to validate their costs. A recent report published
in the U.S. concluded that
The directed nature of Soviet behavior, the time frame over which
these operations have been carried out, and the risks that have been
incurred to conduct these activities in the face of a contrary political
policy toward Europe and the West all suggest civilian-military
agreement on the strategic importance of the Scandinavian peninsula
and the role it could play in a future conflict.40
39Anders Ohman, "Seven Submarine Alerts This Year," Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), 29
October 1990, 5, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 23 November 1990, and
"Sweden Continues Hunt for Red October," Wall Street Journal, 5 June 1990, 20. The
FBIS report listed eight submarine alerts in from January-October 1990, with the latest
occuring on 13 October. The Wall Street Journal article reported that on 15 May the
Swedish Navy detected an "unidentified submarine lurking underneath a major Swedish
naval exercise" In the Baltic near Stockholm. The Swedes dropped "Elmas," grenade-like
weapons designed to force the submarine to the surface, but not to sink it. The Elmas
apparently missed and, in the resulting confusion, sonar contact was lost.
40McCormick, ix. With the immense problems facing the Soviet leadership on the
domestic front and the reduced tensions in Central Europe, one would wonder about
Gorbachev's motives. Another theory is that the military leadership is attempting to
distance itself from the USSR's failing political leaders by exerting its independence and
flouting its capabilities. Neither theory holds particular promise for reduced tensions in
the High North.
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At stake for the Swedes is the credibility of their foreign
policy. The principle behind the doctrine of armed neutrality is the
capability and willingness to protect the nation's territorial integrity.
However, for almost thirty years, and in particular since 1981, the
Soviet Navy has been able to operate with impunity in Swedish home
waters. Whether the cause of Sweden's failure to halt the incursions is
due to inadequate ASW equipment and training or more a lack of will on
the part of the government is merely academic. The state's ability to
claim the deterrent value of its vaunted armed neutrality posture has
been greatly compromised. 41 Consequently, Sweden's role in the 'Nordic
Balance' and the efficacy of its foreign policy vis J vis the superpowers
is now in question.
B. FINLAND
1. Evolution of an Independent State
That Finland's destiny is tied inevitably to the fates of its
Scandinavian and Russian neighbors is a fact of geography and common
history. For almost seven hundred years the territory which is now
Finland was a semi-autonomous region of the greater Swedish Empire. For
much of this early period, Finnish fortunes were subject to the relative
military strengths of its Swedish and Russian neighbors. In 1809,
following the Russian victory in the Russo-Swedish War, the country was
ceded to St. Petersburg and became the Grand Duchy of Finland. Largely a
poor agrarian society until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the
41l1S Sweden Neutral, or Neutered?" Chicago Tribune, 8 November 1981. "What the
submarine incident (U-1371 showed is that Sweden is not neutral at all. It is merely
neutered."
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Finns were granted considerable autonomy by their eastern rulers. They
were granted permission to establish a constitutional government, a
separate currency and armed forces, and to retain the advanced judicial
and administrative system introduced by the Swedes. The degree of
Finnish autonomy was remarkable for the time. Even following the
European nationalist movements in the 1830s and 40s, when liberal ideas
threatened the ancient rdgime, Tsar Nicholas I was said to have remarked
to his ministers, "Leave the Finns alone. It is the only part of my realm
which never has given us any trouble."42 Nevertheless, in the latter part
of the century, the Tsar systematically reigned in the freedoms of the
Empire's boundary regions. In 1890, the 'Russification' program under
Nicholas II intensified St. Petersburg's control of Finland, and by 1899 the
Finnish Army was abolished and Russians began to gain control of the civil
service. Finnish resistance to this point remained passive but pervasive.
Antagonisms reached the boiling point in 1903 when Finnish nationalists
assassinated the Russian Governor-General. Although regional tensions
began to recede in years leading up to the First World War as Russia
became entangled in struggles first with the Japanese, then with the
European Great Powers, the situation in the North remained unstable. The
Finns were appeased in the short term when the entire population
including women - was enfranchised in 1906. 43 Nonetheless, the Finnish
42Max Jakobson, Finland: Myth and Reality (Keuruu, Finland: Otava, 1987), 23.
43The enfranchisement of Finnish women in 1906 represents the first such step on the
European continent and was preceded only by New Zealand. See Jakobson and Stoddard, et
al. Historical background, although somewhat Russo-centric, on Finland can be found also
in Roy Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-84 (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985) and Ordan Bemer, Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries
(New York: University Press of America, 1986).
27
intelligentsia, dissatisfied with the harsh measures of the 'Russification,'
sought solace abroad and were influenced to a large degree by the Germans
and the Danes. The growing Fenno-German relationship would have
irreconcilable consequences for the small Nordic nation in the twentieth
century.
Geography helped the Finns avoid the First World War, and quickly
following the collapse of the imperial regime in Russia, the Finnish
parliament declared national independence on 15 November 1917. The
Bolshevik leaders agreed to cede Finland on 31 December and the new
Soviet Central Executive Committee ratified the transfer of territory on 3
January 1918, at which time the German government became the first to
recognize Finland as a sovereign state. Lenin apparently anticipated an
immediate socialist seizure of power. By allowing the succession he
hoped to speed the proletariat's rise to power while nullifying Finnish
bourgeois claims of Great Russian chauvinism. Stalin, as Commissar for
Nationalities, expected the newly-liberated people eventually to seek
reunification with the Soviet Union as the Finnish Socialist Republic. 44
The Bolsheviks were leaving little to chance, however. On 18 January, the
Fled Guard (Finnish Cor,,,,unists with Bolshevik support) seized the
Helsinki train station as the first step to control of the country's major
industrial centers. The Protective Corps - or White Guard, led by General
Carl Gustav Mannerheim - organized an army, formed around a core of
German-trained and supplied soldiers, to restore order. The war between
44AIllison, 5.
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the Reds and Whites, which was "as cruel as civil wars usually are," 45
lasted until 15 May 1918 when the conservative Protective Corps
prevailed, with victory ensured by the landing of a German expeditionary
force in southern Finland.
Negotiations to formalize a peace treaty between the Finns and
the Soviets began in mid-1920. The Finns sought to expand their territory
and claimed all of East Karelia including the Kola Peninsula in their initial
demands. The Bolsheviks rejected the proposal and made counter demands
but after hard negotiations ceded the Arctic port of Petsamo to Finland in
exchange for a Finnish repudiation of all claims to East Karelia and a
settlement of borders along the lines granted to the Finnish autonomous
region in 1812. In the view of the chief Finnish negotiator, J. K. Paasikivi,
his country might have given more territorial concessions to the Soviets
to ensure a stable relationship in the future. Paasikivi's understanding of
geopolitical Realpolitik later would serve Finland extremely well.
However, the prevailing mood in the Finnish government labeled Soviet
Russia as the perivihollinen - the 'hereditary enemy' - and was prepared to
offer little quarter for Bolshevik security interests in 1920.46
Domestically, following success in the civil war, the
conservative, pro-German faction emerged as the dominant force in
Finnish politics. The radical leftist ideology was viewed as the major
threat to internal security and the ruling Establishment banned the
Communist Party and drove its supporters underground in a 1920s version
45Jakobson, 27. General Mannerheim, though Finnish born, achieved rank in theImperial Russian Army, where he served until called to Finnish service by :he parliament
at the onset of civil war.
46AIlison, 5.
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of the McCarthy witchhunts three decades later in the U.S. Finnish foreign
policy did not hide its distrust of Soviet motives nor its disregard for
Moscow's security interests. The government fostered close ties to the
German Republic in the interwar years, and using the League of Nations as
a forum, united with Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in a round
condemnation of Soviet designs. The Finns and their Baltic neighbors to
the south apparently believed that the collective security apparatus of the
League would protect them from Great Power aggression. Some members
of the government began to worry that their antagonisms of the Soviets
would lead to doub'.., as to Finnish intentions in a future war. Not until
the early 1930s d.d these voices of reason begin to gain the upperhand in
national decisionmaking. In 1932, Finland signed a treaty of non-
aggression with the Soviet Union, and two years later, the entry of the
Soviet Union into the League of Nations and its increasingly overt
hostility toward Germany forced the Finns to reappraise their own foreign
policy. The government made overtures to the other Scandinavian neutrals
in an attempt to place the country beyond the arena of Great Power
interests. For the Soviets, however, the Finnish moves were too little too
late. By the mid-1930s, Moscow considered Finland to be the likely point
of departure for German aggression directed at Leningrad and proposed
negotiations to ensure the defense of the homeland. The Finns accepted
the need for negotiations in 1938 against the backdrop of rapidly
deteriorating conditions in Central Europe. Nevertheless, when Soviet
diplomats proposed altering the borders to the west to secure the
approaches to Leningrad and offered a mutual-defense treaty, the Finns
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abjectly refused. They did not share the sense of the Nazi threat to the
North offered by the Soviets.47 Rather, Helsinki's concerns were directed
still toward founded, but ill-timed fears of Russian encroachment on
Finnish sovereignty.
2. Finland in World War Two
a. The Winter War
The refusal by the Finns to seriously consider the Soviet
proposals in the 1938 negotiations would degrade their bargaining
position in the next round of discussions in the following Autumn. Among
the secret protocols signed by the Germans and Soviets in September 1939
(the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was the inclusion of the Baltic states and
Finland into Moscow's sphere of influence.48 In October the Soviet
leadership invited the Finns to Moscow to discuss "concrete political
questions." Stalin presented his position in simple terms: he needed more
depth for the defense of Leningrad, depth that could only come at the
expense of Finnish territory. Under Stalin's requirements, Finland would
cede islands in the Gulf of Finland and the border on the Karelian isthmus
would be pushed back in exchange for territory in Soviet Karelia.49
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had already agreed to similar demands. At
the same time, London and Paris refused to interfere as they at least
implicitly agreed with the Soviet's northern flank containment of the
Germans, while Washington remained neutral. Although the Finns realized
47The Finnish President for most of this period was Svinhufvud (1931-37), openly pro-
German and anti-Soviet. The anti-communist purges were still in force throughout much
of Finland, while a small, but vociferous fascist party was tolerated by the government.
4 8jakobson, 29-30. See also Allison, 7.
4 9 1bid.
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that they stood alone, they were not prepared to accept Stalin's demands.
They did, however, yield some territory to the north of Leningrad, but
refused to cede the island bases to Moscow out of fear that the Soviets
would use them to subvert Finland.
When negotiations broke down over the issue of the Hanko
naval base on the Gulf of Finland, Moscow initiated an aggressive anti-
Finnish propaganda campaign. In the span of less than one month, several
border incidents occurred; the Soviets demanded that the Finns move their
military forces unilaterally twenty-five kilometers from the border; as a
result of "Finnish Provocations," Moscow declared the non-aggression pact
null and void; and, Soviet diplomatic personnel were recalled from the
capital.50 On 30 November, the Soviets invaded Finland without a
declaration of war and marched toward Helsinki in what they supposed
would be a quick and decisive victory. Stalin made two obvious errors,
however: he launched the offensive at the start of the worst winter
weather in memory, and he failed to account for the determined defense of
a people struggling for national survival. Although out-numbered and
lacking modern military supplies, the Finns resisted fiercely and stopped
the Russian advance, inflicted heavy casualties, and stabiliz:. . the front.
Stalin visibly was surprised by the successful defense, and ordered a halt
to offensive operations and a call to his military commanders to regroup
in Soviet Karelia. With new tactics and increased troop strength, Stalin
resumed the offensive in February and quickly broke through the Finnish
defensive line on the isthmus.
50Berner, 25.
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At the time, world opinion was focused on the small, but
remarkable struggle for survival in the North. In the U.S. and throughout
West Europe there were announcements of formations of international
brigades to support the brave Finns. Britain and France commenced
preparations for military operations against the USSR. The Finns were
overwhelmed - they had never been the focus of international attention
and consequently were inclined to believe that a global 'correlation of
forces' was gathering in their favor. In the end, little active support for
the Finns materialized. British and French plans were quite unrealistic
given the threat to their interests - and sovereignty - in Central Europe by
Nazi Germany. In retrospect, however, the threat of allied action against
the Soviets may have been enough to bring Moscow to the negotiating table
in March 1940. When the Soviets halted the second offensive early that
month, the Finns were wise to agree to negotiations rather than applying
to the Allies for assistance that would in any event have provided little
tangible support. In the ensuing peace treaty signed in Moscow, the terms
were necessarily harsh for the Finns. The Soviets hoped to regain their
position of credibility vis J vis the other continental powers.
Consequently, after one hundred days of fighting in the Winter War,
Finland ceded territories which placed the country in a far more
compromised position than that represented at the talks in 1938-39. 5 1
51The Finns lost 25,000 dead (of a total population of nearly 4 million) in three months of
fierce fighting. At the peace treaty, the following territories were ceded: the Hanko
Peninsula, all of the Viipuri province, the Karelian isthmus, and territories to the north.
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b. The Continuation War
The Winter War, as Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson termed it,
was merely the first act in the Soviet-Finnish drama. 52 Following the
peace treaty, tensions between the two countries remained high. Finnish
concerns rose dramatically after Moscow annexed the Baltic states in
August 1940. The government persisted in its efforts to garner
international recognition of Finnish neutrality, primarily with the goal of
establishing a regional defense agreement with Sweden as the anchor.
Stockholm was, though, much too concerned with Great Power designs
against its own territory to reduce dangerously low stocks of military
equipment by supplying the Finns, nor did it wish to become entangled in a
losing Fenno-Soviet dispute. Therefore, the Finns, as in 1939, were
prepared to stand alone against the USSR until Hitler proposed the sale of
modern armaments to Finland in exchange for transit rights for German
troops enroute to Norway. Sweden had concluded previously a similar
agreement, and Helsinki jumped at the chance for a new power balance in
the region. While Finland was never formally allied with Germany, the
agreement signalled the beginning of a tenuous four-year de facto military
alliance. Three days after Hitler initiated Operation Barbarossa, the
Soviets launched air attacks into Finnish territory and that evening, on 25
June 1941, the government declared war on the Soviet Union. At the
height of the war, the Germans had 150,000 troops stationed in Finland,
but Finnish troops were credited with offensive operations that pushed
the Soviets back to the 1939 borders. The Finnish commanders, however,
foolishly pressed further into Russian territory in an attempt to conquer
52Jakobson, 37.
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all of Soviet Karelia. There, in 1944, they met a reinforced Soviet
counteroffensive. Finnish troops were forced to retreat back into Finland,
surrendering all of their recent territorial gains. Helsinki's proposals for
a truce were met with Soviet demands for complete surrender. Between
the Scylla of annihilation and the Charybdis of subjection to Moscow's
demands, the Finnish government looked again to the Germans. Hitler's
terms for support included a demand that the Finns not seek a separate
peace - a key element of Helsinki's effort to free Finnish territory of both
powers. Placed in the apparently insoluble position, President Ryti
exceeded his constitutional powers and personally agreed to Hitler's
proposal. The Soviets, their interest now concentrated on the race to
Berlin, had few troops to spare against a combined Fenno-Nazi force and
signalled their willingness for an armistice. President Ryti quickly
resigned, and in a clever bit of diplomacy, General Mannerheim replaced
him and immediately informed the Germans that he considered Ryti's
promise illegal and would seek a separate peace with Moscow directly.
Betrayed, the Germans retreated to Norway from their Lapland positions,
laying waste the region in the process, Hitler's revenge for the Finn's
deceit.5 3
The armistice agreement was signed in Moscow on 19
September 1944. The terms of peace restored the 1940 borders, but the
Finns were forced to cede Petsamo (renamed Pechenga) and the Porkkala
Peninsula to the Soviets.5 4 Additionally, in the six years of fighting
53 1bid., 42. By September 1944, German troop strength had increased to 200,000 men.
It took a campaign of six months for the Finns to drive the Germans out of Lapland across
the Arctic frontier.
54 Porkkala is a mere twelve miles from Helsinki; the naval base was returned eventually
to Finnish control.
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Soviets and Germans, the Finns lost 87,000 men - 2.3% of the population.
Finland received little international sympathy, however; they were viewed
as allied with Hitler (ignoring the subtle subterfuges of the Finnish
government), and consequently were on the 'losing' side in post-war
negotiations. In answering critics of this unholy alliance, Finns apply the
Macchiavellian principle "that for the purpose of saving the country no
proposition ought to be rejected .... (t)he defence of the country is always
good no matter whether effected by honourable or ignominious means." s 5
Certainly the Finns compromised in their dealings with the Soviets, but
they gained in return the chance to retain national sovereignty. The
Treaty of Peace with Finland, signed by the Allied powers in Paris in
1947, formalized the armistice agreements reached with the Soviets in
1944. In addition, the terms called for reparations to the USSR including
industrial and military equipment and a war indemnity of $300 million.56
In the end, Finnish reluctance to balance Soviet insecurities in 1920 and
1939 proved an extremely costly adventure for the small republic.
3. The Cold War and the Search for an Independent Policy
The first post-war President of Finland was Paasikivi, elected by
a unanimous vote of parliament in April 1946. After three decades of
negotiating with St. Petersburg and Moscow, including twenty meetings
with Stalin and Molotov, Paasikivi held a firm grasp on Soviet national
interests and Finland's place within them.5 7 He was determined to govern
551bid., 39, quoted from Niccolo Macchiavelli, The Prince.
56Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty of Peace with Finland, Helsinki, 1947.
57Paasikivi recounted to his American counterpart during his tour as Ambassador in
Moscow following the Winter War, "he had learned that prestige meant more to them than
anything else; that their invariable policy was to obtain what they could for as little as
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Finland in the regional Realpolitik. Failure to account for Russian/Soviet
security interests in the past had exacted severe costs from the Finns.
Therefore, the main task of the state's foreign policy was to search for a
modus vivendi with the USSR. Paasikivi was prepared to recognize
legitimate claims for ensuring Soviet security in the post-war
environment. These claims came in February 1948 in the form of a letter
from Stalin to Paasikivi stating Moscow's desire to form a mutual defense
treaty along lines similar to those drafted with the USSR's East European
satellites. Paasikivi did not find the concept of a defense treaty with the
Soviets in itself unacceptable. Stalin's models for corroboration - those
forced on the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians - were out of the question.
Instead, Paasikivi boldly put forth his version of an acceptable defense
agreement, one that might reflect both Soviet and Finnish national
interests. Rather than dismissing the document, Moscow accepted the
compromise solution in its entirety. The result was the Treaty of
Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance signed in April 1948. The
main provisions of the -eaty include a defense arrangement whereby the
Soviets would assist Finland in the event of a German attack on Finnish
territory or on the USSR through Finland; Finland would defend its
sovereignty in case of attack; and, the Finns and Soviets would "confer
with each other" in the event of a threat of attack in the above
possible and then ask for more; that they never sacrificed immediate gains for
considerations for the future; that they paid no attention to what was said, but only to what
was done; that they endeavored to be paid a high price for what they must do anyway; and
that they were Impervious to ethical and humanitarian factors or those of abstract justice,
being influenced exclusively by practical and realistic considerations." Quoted from U.S.Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FR), 1941, vol. 1, p.30, in
Berner, 41.
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situations.5 8 While the West viewed the Treaty as the surrender of
Finland to the East, the Finns saw it as a small nation's hope for national
survival under the shadow of an insecure, yet powerful neighbor. Put in
global perspective, of all of the European states bordering the Soviet
Union only Finland remained a free democracy following the Second World
War. Signing of the FCMA opened the door for work on Finland's major Cold
War objective: neutrality. The policy of nonalignment explicit in the
preamble of the Treaty and an avoidance of conflict with the Soviet Union
were the necessary pre-conditions for the country's neutrality. The
Finnish leadership would steer a cautious course between East and West
as the Cold War warmed and cooled over the next forty years. The program
was not devoid of costs; the Finns self-imposed restraints on liberalism
that might have been regarded as extreme in the West.5 9 Nonetheless, in
particular in the early stages of the East-West antagonism, Finland's
freedom was held in a delicate balance arguably by its circumspect
responses vis A vis the superpowers.
The country paid its required war reparations on schedule and by
the mid-1950s was entirely free of the Allied Control Commission
occupation forces. In 1955, Moscow sponsored the Finnish application to
the United Nations and, in the following year, ended its lease on the
Porkkala naval base, in effect giving final acquiesance to Finnish
58Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual
Assistance between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Helsinki, 1948.
591n a reminder of the delicate balance between East and West, a1948 provision to the
constitution established punishment in the case of journalistic defamation of foreign
states. Consequently, the media was characterized by a general reluctance to criticize the
USSR, although criticisms of the West were more widespread.
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sovereignty. Paasikivi took this to confirm the success of his eastward-
looking foreign policy. He had argued that Soviet interests in Finland were
purely defensive, and, that once Finnish sincerity concerning the FCMA
could be time-tested, Moscow would fully recognize the legitimate rights
of its Nordic neighbor. The carefully constructed 'Paasikivi line' was
validated by 1956, when the ailing President stepped down in favor of
Urho Kekkonen. The new President quickly assured Moscow that he would
offer no substantive changes to Finnish foreign policy, which the Soviets
were to amend as the 'Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.'
a. The Three Crises
(1) Communist Coup Attempt in 1948. After years of being
illegal, the Finnish Communist Party (SKP), and the communist-supported
Finnish Peoples' Democratic League (SKDL), entered domestic politics with
a suprising amount of support in 1945. In the first elections of the post-
war period, the SKP won 25% of the seats in parliament, became a member
of the ruling coalition, and the party leader was named minister of the
interior. The initial appeal of the communists is credited to wide
dissatisfaction by leftists with the wartime leadership of the Social
Democrat Party and its corraboration with extreme right-wing elements
during the war.60 Many SDP members defected from the party to join, in
particular, the SKDL. Although supported by Moscow, both parties were
reluctant to act on radical advice in fear of upsetting the balance of
power in parliment and losing their first-time electoral victory. When the
Soviets called for general strikes and protests in 1947, the communist
6 AIlison, 131.
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and SKDL ministers condemned the plan for interfering with the rebuilding
of the Finnish economy.61
By 1947-48, however, few Finns were interested in the
radical message of the SKP and its allies. The peoples' primary interest
was to rebuild the war-torn country and settle its differences with its
superpower neighbor. Consequently, domestic support for the SKP and
SKDL waned. The turning point in the parties' fortunes came in 1948 in
the intense ratification debate of the FCMA Treaty. Anti-Soviet members
of parliament contested the loss of sovereignty implicit in the treaty,
while realists, under Paasikivi's leadership, questioned the alternatives.
During this debate, rumors that the communists were going to attempt to
seize power brought a quick response from the president. The military
positioned troops and equipment around the capital and police forces were
glerted.6 2 No coup was in fact attempted, and Helsinki quietly returned to
,-ormal. The SKP thereafter could muster little support and suffered
significant losses in subsequent elections.6 3
Stalin's interests in East Central Europe extended along a
north-south axis from the Arctic to the Adriatic. In his plans for a
Soviet-dominated Europe, Stalin envisioned the continent divided into
three political spheres:
1. a non-communist, relatively stable region in Western Europe...;
61 Ibid., 132-33. The SKP and SKDL leaders emphasized the need for a strong economy to





2. a Communist region under Soviet control in Eastern Europe...;
3. an intermediate region in East Central Europe of coalitional political
systems under only gradually increasing Communist influence, extending
from Yugoslavia in the south through Austria, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia to Finland in the north.6 4
If the Finns' fate was to be similar to that of the Czechs and Hungarians,
why did the Communist infiltration of Finland so obviously fail? One
reason is that Moscow was never able to rally popular support in the
country for the Communist message. The government's realist foreign
policy aside, the Soviet Union was still viewed by the Finn as the
perivihollinen. The non-Communist forces in Finland were too well
organized to allow the post-war balance of domestic power slip forever to
the East and were prepared to use equivalent means to battle the political
adversary.6 5 In addition, the timing of the 'rumor' of a possible coup
attempt worked extremely well for the government. Paasikivi was able to
demonstrate his resolve against Moscow's meddling in Finnish domestic
affairs and in doing so answered critics in the FCMA Treaty debate.
(2) The 'Night Frost of 1958. Kekkonen faced his first of two
serious challenges from the Soviet Union in 1958. Moscow had stayed
relatively c:lear of Finnish domestic politics since the FCMA Treaty.,
S4Chardes Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986),15.
65 Ibid., 18. Gati quotes James H. Billington, "Finland," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P.
Thornton, eds., Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 117-44. According to Billington's
account of the Communists failure in Finland, "First and perhaps most important was the
willingness of its opponents to resort to the same tactics of terror and violence that the
Communists themselves employed. This is not a conclusion that is pleasing to the liberal
mind; but the fact Is that ...calculated threats of terror by otherwise humane Finns were
effective, not particularly bloody, and probably indispensable for the preservation of
Finnish democracy."
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Following the elections in the Fall, the Soviet Ambassador to Helsinki left
his post without ceremony or explanation and bilateral negotiations of all
types were frozen. Moscow declared that it was not pleased with the
composition of the new government of Social Democrats and
Conservatives. In particular, the Soviets were concerned about the
possible selection of an anti-communist prime minister. Khrushchev
apparently felt the Finns might be pressing their advantage following the
return of Porkkala and increasing trade contact with the West. The Soviet
Union's warning was subtle yet pointed. Kekkonen directed the parliament
to form a minority government under the leadership of the small Agrarian
Party. Meeting Kekkonen in Leningrad, Khrushchev explained his concern
with a potential anti-Soviet stance by the Finns; appraised of the new
government, the Soviet leader immediately lifted the sanctions.66 For his
part, the Finnish President defined his adherence to his predecessor's
policy of careful appeasement of the USSR. Conversely, Khrushchev
betrayed the lingering Soviet interest in Finnish domestic affairs.
(3) The 'Note Crisis' of 1961.67 Moscow's interest in its
neighbor's internal politics led to a second, more serious crisis three
years later. The 'Note Crisis' in 1961 w - rooted in Soviet concerns over
the increasing build-up of German military activity in the Baltic.
Although Bonn had begun to rearm under NATO auspices in the mid-1950s,
in 1961 the Atlantic Alliance formed the Baltic Approaches Command - a




joint German-Danish integrated military under Danish control.68 At the
same time, the German Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss was visiting
Norway to coordinate German participation in NATO maneuvers in that
country. Taken exclusive of other events around the globe, these actions
appeared to the Soviets as a concerted effort by Germany to reintroduce
its influence in the region.69 Moscow used this 'threat' to call for a
conference under the articles of the FCMA. Kekkonen, vacationing in the
U.S., sent his foreign minister to Moscow to interpret the Kremlin's
designs. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko relayed tha the Soviet
leadership was deeply concerned over the possible election of revanchist
elements of the Social Democratic Party in the next voting. Combined
with the advancement of German interests in other parts of Scandinavia,
the threat of anti-Soviet elements gaining control of the Finnish
presidency provided the impetus for the now-famous exchange of notes.
Kekkonen, upon his return, met with Khrushchev in Leningrad to explain
Finnish policy. He reaffirmed Finland's commitment to a stable and
mutually-beneficial relationship with the USSR. The President's cautious
yet direct approach to a potentially explosive situation gained the Soviet's
r3spect and trust. As a result, Moscow backed down on its request for the
FCMA conference, the issue quickly fizzled, and the suspect SDP
68BALTAP was formed as a compromise solution by NATO: the Germans wanted protection
for their northern flank, while the Danes wanted guarantees for the Alliance's defense of
the Jutland peninsula. The Danes, however, were still dubious of the most likely
guarantor - Germany - because of recent (WWII) experiences. The compromise was
BALTAP, placing troops from Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland in an integrated command led
by a Danish admiral.
69Namely, increasing Sino-Soviet tensions; Soviet pressure on the Allied position in
Berlin; and, NATO's new emphasis on conventional arms build-up under the doctrine of
flexible response.
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presidential candidate quietly withdrew his name from consideration. The
subtities of the Finnish negotiating position may have been lost on the
West. Nevertheless, the Finns successfully managed another crisis as
they climbed the ladder toward international recognition of their
precarious nonalignment/neutrality policy.
4. Economics and Neutrality
The 'Note Crisis' presented the last serious challenge to domestic
politics in the Cold War period. The Finnish government was therefore
able to concentrate its unrestricted energies on two areas: rebuilding the
domestic economy and firmly establishing the country as a model neutral
state. Success in the first was dramatic. Although the Finns reluctantly
refused to join the Marshall plan because of Soviet concerns of Western
influence, the nation united in producing its own Wirtschaftswunder.
From 1950-1974, the economy grew at a remarkable 4.9%; in the 1970s
and 80s, the pace remained a steady 4.0%.70 While trade with the Soviet
Union represented the single largest share of this achievement, improving
relations with the West fueled the rapid expansion of quality and high
technology products for import/export. Whereas through the early 1980s
around one-fourth of the nation's trade was conducted with East Bloc
economies, by 1989 that number had dropped to less than 14%. Two-thirds
of Finland's current trade is with the European Community, with Britain
and Germany providing the main markets for Finnish goods outside of
Scandinavia. 71 Perhaps the most significant step in Finland's economic
7 0 Patrick Humphreys, Finland and Europe (Helsinki: Tietosanoma, 1990), 11.
7 1 Ibid., and International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1990
(Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, 1990), 176-8. Through the mid-
1980s, trade with the USSR represented over 20% of Finland's total. Fenno-Soviet trade
worked (until 1990) on the barter system - finished products from Finland were
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progress was the increased contact with Western markets following the
country's membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in
1961.72 EFTA provided an open market in which to sell Finnish raw
materials and light industrial goods. In return, the Finns received the
heavy machinery and technology necessary to reconstitute their
industries. As a result, Finland 'westernized' its economy without
disturbing trade relations with the East. Rather, the open door to the
Soviet Union funnelled a steady supply of contemporary western goods to
Moscow.
The period of sustained economic growth and a secure domestic
scene gave Finland the chance to concentrate on implementing its non-
alignment strategy. Since the interwar years and the prelude to
hostilities, the Finns have applied for international recognition of their
neutral and non-aligned status. The preamble of the FCMA Treaty
expressed Finland's desire to "remain outside the conflicting interests of
the Great Powers." Seven years later, Finland's membership in the United
Nations provided the international forum for advancing the state's
declared position of neutrality in war and non-alignment in peacetime.
More than statements of intent, Finland's circumspect foreign policy and
its steadfast determination to remain outside the Cold War struggle
exchanged for raw materials (mainly fuel, Finland's major import) from the Soviets.
Trade dipped after 1983 with the dramatic decrease in the international price of oil.
72 EFTA was formed In 1959 when Britain, rebuffed by French refusal to accept British
demands for a wider free-trade area, organized a trade league outside of the EEC. Besides
Britain, the six initial signatories to EFTA included Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and
Switzerland. Finland did not join initially because of difficulties in arranging a free trade
agreement with the Soviet Union, its major trading partner at the time. The difficulties
were resolved in 1961 when Finland signed mutually acceptable free trade agreements
with EFTA and the USSR.
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legitimized its non-aligned status. The policy has been a success; for the
last three decades Finland has remained free of much of the superpower




THE SUPERPOWERS AND 'NORDIC STABILITY'
Any analysis of Swedish or Finnish foreign policy must take into
account its 'Nordic' element. Although the countries have emphasized
longstanding traditions of nonalignment and neutrality, the ideological
roots of the foreign policy of both are historically and culturally tied to
Scandinavia. The Nordic states, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
Finland, share a strong sense of common identity which shows
frequently in their security policy priorities and decisions. Norway and
Denmark are extremely sensitive of the impact that their NATO
obligations may have on non-aligned Sweden and Finland. Similarly, the
Swedes and Finns have minimized their criticisms of the Soviet Union
to keep tensions low in the Eastern Baltic and the Gulf of Finland. While
often faulted in the West, actions (or inactions) such as Finland's
careful relationship with Moscow, Stockholm's compromising stand on
the Soviet submarine violations of territorial waters, and the lukewarm
response by both governments to the Baltic States' independence
movements are considered by domestic policymakers to be a key
element in the governments' pursuit of regional stability. The 'Nordic
Balance,' as the posture has been termed, is less an alliance of the
Scandinavian states than a philosophy aimed at keeping East-West
tensions at a low level by remaining alert to regional sensitivities.
The 'Nordic Balance' is founded on the dual concept of 'deterrence-
reassurance.' 73 The 'deterrence' component is two-fold: the first
73Bitzinger, Denmark, Norway, and NA TO, 17.
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aspect refers to an effective national defense posture; the second
concerns the NATO members, Iceland, Denmark, and Norway, and pertains
to Allied, mainly U.S. and British, promises to deter, and if necessary, to
help defend against external threats through reinforcements and, in
extremis, nuclear retaliation. The 'reassurance' component has as its
objective to assure the Soviet Union of the region's non-aggressive
stance. This aspect of the policy has grown in popularity since the
USSR's detente offensive of the early 1970s. It comprises restrictions
on domestic military capabilities, banning of foreign bases and nuclear
weapons on Scandinavian soil, and a heavy reliance on compromise and
consensus in superpower dealings. 74
In planning for the national defense, the Swedes and Finns use the
concept of 'marginality.' The concept revolves around the idea that, in
war, Sweden or Finland would represent only a 'marginal' strategic goal
for an aggressor, and that consequently, the invader would use
'marginal' forces - qualitatively and numerically - in the attack. In The
Future of the Nordic Balance, author Nils Andr6n noted that his country's
defense planning is based on the premise that,
an enemy that might threaten or attack Sweden will always hold back a
considerable part of his resources for other purposes such as opposing
an expected or surprise confrontation with another superpower.
Consequently only a part of a superpower's military force can be used to
attack Sweden. If the enemy's objectives in Sweden are limited and if
the country is able to defend itself, the cost of controlling Sweden or
part of it will be disproportionate to the cost of aggression.7 5
74See Bitzinger, 8-17, for a more complete analysis of the NATO aspects of the 'Nordic
Balance.' The foreign bases ban includes permanently stationed allied troops but does not
restrict, in Norway's case, a ban on pre-positioned equipment for allied reinforcements.
75 Quoted in Kruzel, 541.
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Andr6n's description applies equally to Finland. So long as superpower
competition remained a part of Nordic strategies, 'marginality' was a
realistic and functional assumption. If the Cold War is ending, and the U.S.
and USSR can resolve the remaining strategic questions in the High North,
Swedish and Finnish defense planners may need to revise the way they
view the next war.
A comparative analysis of defense spending (see Table IV.A.1.) gives
an enlightening picture of the relative trends in Swedish and Finnish
defense policy, and perhaps some insight into regional threat perceptions.
In an era of expensive, technology-intensive weaponry, the Swedes have
cut back the share of the national budget devoted to defense throughout
the 1980s. In the early 1960s, the period most analysts consider the
high-point of Swedish defense effectiveness, military budgets were 4-
4.5% of the Gross National Product; defense spending now accounts for
little more than one-half of that amount. 7s The high cost of manning and
equipping the Swedish military combined with a smaller share of the
budget means smaller or lesser capable armed forces. In fact, current
frontline forces available for immediate mobilization are between one-
third and one-half the levels that could be mustered in the 1950s. 76
75 Western Europe 1989: A Political and Economic Survey (London: Europa
Publications, 1988), 443, and Kennedy-Minott, U.S. Regional Force Application(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 34. In 1955, the Swedish Air Force
consisted of 17 wings with 33 squadrons; by the end of the 1980s these numbers have
decreased to 7 wings of 8 squadrons (Kennedy-Minott).
7 6 1bid.
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Table IV.A.1. Comparison of Public Defense Expenditures 7 7
Public Defense Expenditures
millions of US$ % ugofGNP
Country 1980 1982 1984 1980 1982 1984 198019841986
Sweden 3867 2840 2862 8.0 7.3 7.2 3.3 3.0 2.5
Finland 734 809 815 5.4 5.7 5.7 1.4 1.6 2.1
In contrast, the Finnish defense budget in the last decade has kept
pace not only with the rising costs of arming a modern military, but it
actually has increased relative to the country's GNP. Under the
limitations of the 1947 Treaty of Peace, the size of Finnish defense
forces and how they may be equipped is strictly defined.78 Therefore, the
Finns have used budget allocations to produce a modern, technology-
intensive military under the restrictions imposed by the peace treaty. The
air force is a good example. Finnish forces currently include aircraft
purchased from both Sweden and the USSR; among the follow-on defense
fighter aircraft being considered for purchase are the Swedish JAS
Grippen, the Soviet MIG-29, and the U.S.-built F-16. 79 All are state-of-
the-art options for the Finns. Implications of the United States entering
the Finnish defense market will be discussed below.
77BjOrn Hagelin, Neutrality and Foreign Military Sales (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990),
39.
78 Treaty of Peace with Finland, Part III, Articles 13-22. Some of the limitations include:
a maximum force strength of 34,400-man army, sixty aircraft and 3,000-man air
force, shipping weight to 10,000 tons and 4,500-man navy. Certain offensive weapons
were also prohibited under the treaty. This list includes motor torpedo boats,
submarines, torpedoes, mines, bombers, certain types of civilian aircraft, guided
missiles, and nuclear weapons.
79 1nterview between the author and United States Department of Defense personnel,
Washington, D.C., 12-16 November 1990.
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A shadow of doubt is cast on the efficacy of the 'reassurance' aspect
of regional foreign policy given Moscow's apparent absence of concern for
Scandinavian interests in its 'militarization' of the northern flank.
Western critics, especially in the U.S., cite Sweden's and Finland's role in
'reassurance' as merely appeasement.80 The relatively mild response of
the Swedish government following the 'Whiskey on the Rocks' incident and
its subsequent failure to halt the incursions may have encouraged the
Soviet Union to claim the Baltic as a de facto mare nostrum. Moreover,
quiet diplomacy by the neutrals seemingly has done little to stem the tide
of the Kola build-up. American-Swedish relations in particular have
followed a rocky path since World War Two and the recent criticisms are
but the latest round of crossfire. Many in the U.S. viewed Swedish
neutrality in the 1940s as a cowardly unwillingness to support a just and
moral cause.8' When the lines of the Cold War were drawn in the
aftermath of World War Two, the Atlantic Alliance found little support in
Sweden's nonalignment policies.
On the other hand, Sweden has found much to fault with U.S. foreign
policy. Swedes have criticized America's Cold War rhetoric for fueling
East-West tensions and have decried U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia
and Central America with the full moralistic fervor of Swedish foreign
policy. The bellicose anti-Soviet line pursued by the Reagan
administration, and its insistence on 'Star Wars' and INF deployment did
8OKennedy-Minott, 8-9. This point is driven home by the view of one Norwegian analyst
that "a policy of prudence involves avoiding extremes. Unmitigated pursuit of deterrence
could result in provocation, while maximizing reassurance could lead to appeasement."
Quoted in Kennedy-Minott, U.S. Regional Force Application, 25.
81Kennedy-Minott, Lonely Path to Follow, 1.
51
little to assuage Swedish concerns in the early 1980s. However, by the
latter part of the decade, Swedish foreign policy became preoccupied with
the Soviet 'problem.' When the U.S. Navy publicly announced its Forward
Maritime Strategy in January 1986, criticisms were limited to the
aggressive comments by the proponents of the doctrine rather than to the
strategy itself.82 For its part, the U.S. Navy has applied lessons from past
unilateralism and has followed a careful line in promoting the FMS with
due regard for regional stability and political concerns. The overriding
view in Swedish circles is that the Americans "responded responsibly to
the Soviet threat" and that the U.S./NATO naval presence in the northern
seas "serves a pragmatic, stabilizing purpose." 83 It is difficult to
forecast the direction that relations between the Nordic neutrals and the
U.S./NATO will follow given the dramatic events unfolding in Eastern and
Central Europe. The Atlantic Alliance will certainly maintain a credible
presence in the High North until the domestic political situation in the
USSR begins to stabilize and the Kola Peninsula is significantly
demilitarized.
As noted above, it is illegal for the Finnish media to defame a foreign
state. Consequently, severe criticisms of both Soviet and American
policies generally have been muted. Instead, the Finns have been quick to
interpose a positive alternative when superpower stalemates affecting
northern security have occurred. The 1963 proposal by Finnish President
8 2 Kennedy-Minott, U.S. Regional Force Application, 35. See also Ingemar Ddrfer, "The
Nordic Region: Between the U.S., Europe, and the Soviet Union," report from the Swedish
Defense Research Establishment, undated, 10. DOrfer states that the U.S. Navy's
leadership, specifically then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, made "little time" for
the Scandinavians in drawing up the FMS.
8 3 Kennedy-Minott, Lonely Path to Follow, 34.
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Kekkonen for a 'Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone' (NNWFZ) and the
Helsinki-hosted founding of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe in 1975 were among the Cold War alternatives offered by Finland.
The NNWFZ proposal, in particular, has become a cornerstone of Finland's
contribution to the 'reassurance' component of Nordic stability and so
bears explanation. Subsequent to the superpower confrontation over Cuban
missiles and follow-on discussions in NATO concerning a multilateral
nuclear force, President Kekkonen presented the concept of a nuclear
weapons-free Scandinavia. The NNWFZ concept was introduced in May
1963, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, with Kekkonen's suggestion
that its adoption would increase regional stability by preventing the
superpowers from drawing the Scandinavian countries into a nuclear arms
race.84 It seems clear that the Finns were appealing to the Danes and
Norwegians to reconsider any moves toward nuclearization or
participation in NATO's nuclear multilateral force (MLF), then under
discussion. Despite Finnish claims to the contrary, the other northern
states were skeptical of NNWFZ benefits and questioned whether the
proposal was meant to serve regional or Soviet interests.85 Moscow's
response to the Kekkonen plan, on the other hand, was predictably positive:
In the Soviets' view, establishment of the NNWFZ would erect a
84AIlison, 61-4; Kennedy-Minott, Lonely Path to Follow, 12-13; J. Borawski and J.
Valentine, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: The Nordic Case," Naval Forces, vol. 9, (March
1988): 66-71; "Finland's View on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Baltic Sea," press release
from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, He'<. nki, 12 November 1990.
8 5Kennedy-Minott, 12.
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"formidable obstacle.. .to NATO plans to militarise Northern Europe and
involve it in the arms drive."8 6
The Kekkonen plan failed to specify the exact area that would be
included, notably whether it would embrace Soviet soil. When questioned
on this point earlier, however, a Soviet official had replied angrily that "it
is known that Soviet territory is not a part of Scandinavia and it is not
expected to be included in it. Do you want to expand Scandinavia at the
expense of the Soviet Union?"8 7 Moscow's attitude toward a multilateral
commitment to the NNWFZ concept merely reinforced the Danish and
Norwegian stand against it. With the impasse, no action was taken on the
Finnish proposal and it subsequently faded into the background in regional
negotiations. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, filled
many of the roles Kekkonen had envisioned for his plan, but in the 1980s
the nuclear weapon-free zones concept surfaced once again in defense
discussions. The contemporary debate is centered on Soviet President
Gorbachev's October 1987 speech in Murmansk calling for a Nordic "zone of
peace."88 The Soviets are using the theme of lower tensions in Central
Europe to press for an increase in anti-nuclear popular opinion in the
North. The only difference between the Soviet positions appears to be
three decades and a new mouthpiece. Prime Minister Ryzhkov, adding to
Gorbachev's earlier remarks, envisioned a nuclear-free Baltic with the
86V. Golubkov, "President Kekkonen's Important Initiative," International Affairs
(Moscow) no. 8 (1963): 107, quoted in Allison, 63. Foreign Minister Gromyko
described the proposal as one of "great value," and added that the Soviet Union was
prepared to act as 'guarantor' for the zone.
87Allison, 63.
88 Borawski and Valentine, 67.
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USSR again volunteering to serve as guarantor.89 While the NNWFZ concept
is a thoughtful option for reducing the regional superpower competition,
the Kekkonen/Gorbachev proposal is unrealistic: the plan would be
difficult, if not impossible, to verify; it would rely on negative
assurances from the nuclear powers - essentially, a statement of benign
intent; and it appears to benefit the Soviets singularly. The Finns, too,
have become more circumspect in their support for a nuclear-free
proposal. In a response to Moscow's latest attempt to revive a NWFZ
encompassing the Baltic, the Finnish government, while supporting the
'philosophy' of the initiative, pre-conditioned its support on an agreement
to link both sea- and land-based nuclear missiles capable of being used in
the region to the overall ban.90 A Joint Nordic Study is scheduled to
address this issue in its 1991 report. 91  In the interim, the Scandinavians
appear willing to allow regional remnants of the Cold War to subside at
their own pace.
89 1bid.
90OFinland's View on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Baltic Sea." The most recent Soviet
proposal for the Baltic NWFZ was dated 18 October 1990. The press release stated that
"in the Finnish view, there are problems connected with control and verification of the
absence of nuclear weapons at sea that are complicated and remain open so far .... Finland
regards the Soviet unilateral decision concerning the Baltic Sea...as a positive measure
which builds stability and confidence in the critical transition under way in the European
security order."
911bid. The JNS was commissioned by the Nordic es to investigate the means of
implementing the NNWFZ in a way that adequately ddress the spectrum of regional
security concerns.
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V. THE EUROPEAN CONNECTION
In the 1980s, Scandinavia moved from the periphery of the Cold War
superpower confrontation to the forefront. The shift in superpower
attention from Central Europe to the High North caught Finnish and
Swedish foreign policy off-guard. For three decades the Nordics had
enjoyed a relatively quiet existence away from the threat of hostilities.
The Soviet Union's military build-up on the Kola Peninsula led to a mini-
arms race in the High North including the numerous and increasingly
aggressive alien submarine operations in Nordic waters and the U.S.
Navy/NATO response in the form of the Forward Maritime Strategy. In
less than a decade, the Northern Flank became the focal point of the East-
West confrontation.
While the Cold War paradigm is on the verge of becoming irrelevant in
Central Europe, the High North remains an area of unresolved superpower
competition. The Kola Peninsula will remain, for the foreseeable future, a
bastion for Soviet strategic military systems. Consequently, even with
the remarkably fast improvement in East-West relations, the U.S. is likely
to view the Soviet's position in the North as a continued threat to
American/NATO interests. For the Nordic states, this means that they
will have to remain on guard against the by-products of superpower
relations in the region. The neutrals, specifically, should be wary of the
rapidly changing nature of the U.S./Soviet relationship. Nevertheless,
Sweden and Finland are in the unique position of being able to offer their
services as nonaligned states to speed the road to stability in the High
North.
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One of the side effects of the Cold War alliances' scrutiny of Northern
Europe was that the foreign and security policies of the Nordic countries
were suffused with continental interests. In the 1980s, political,
economic, and social concerns in the heart of Europe began to spill over
into the Ncrth. As a result, Scandinavia has become less immune to the
pull of pan-European organizations. The 'Europeanization' of the Nordic
neutrals manifests itself in their views of two preeminent post-Cold War
collective bodies: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
and the European Community. Both neutrals agree that the CSCE is the
natural forum for future continental security questions. Largely because
of the relative stages of their integration, Sweden and Finland maintain
differing views of their roles in the pan-European political and economic
environment; Stockholm, with a larger economy and a considerably more
secure geographic location, has had more contact - political, economic,
and social - with the West than Helsinki. Sweden's break with the
Norwegian and Finnish positions on joining the EC appears to signal a
significant fissure in the coordinated Nordic stance toward European
integration and an end, perhaps, to 'Nordic Stability.' Anything less than a
unified approach from the Nordic states, however, may work to their
detriment. The neutrals, in particular, are in danger of approaching the
new Europe as anachronisms of the Cold War era; they may have little to
offer singly and might find themselves with only a minor role in the
future European fora.
A. THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The CSCE process began in 1975 as part of the Helsinki Final Act,
which recognized the post-Second World War division of Europe in
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exchange for Soviet acceptance of human rights accords. Although
established as a series of conferences merely to review compliance with
the Helsinki agreement, CSCE has evolved into the primary vehicle for
integrating the East and West into a pan-European security apparatus.9 2
The 34-nation body includes the United States, Canada, and all European
nations except Albania. At the Paris Summit of the CSCE in November
1990, heads of state of the member nations agreed to a series of
important changes shaping the future structure of the body. The three
most significant of these included the signing of an agreement to cut
conventional forces in Europe, the blessing of German unification, and the
institutionalization of the CSCE process. In addition, the heads of state
reinforced their commitment to the CSCE's organizational goals by
agreeing to annual summits and to begin regularly scheduled foreign
minister meetings. 93
As small states outside most of Europe's main political and military
structures, Sweden and Finland are pleased to find the role of the CSCE,
the one organization that does give them a voice in continental affairs,
expanding to fill post-Cold War void. Along with some of the East
European countries, the Nordic neutrals have envisioned the scope of the
CSCE growing gradually to become a 'mini-United Nations,' with a security
92
"CSCE Looks to New Role in Europe," Washington Times, 3 October 1990, 9.
93
"The Thrill of Europe's Rebirth," The Economist, 24 November 1990, 49. The thirty-
four nations agreed to establish a small secretariat in Prague, a Crisis Prevention Center
in Vienna, and an office in Warsaw to gather data on elections. The agreements reached fell
short of President Gorbachev's call for a "European common home," or the European
confederation concept envisioned by President Mitterand. The Americans and British
appear to be the least enthusiastic about expanding the CSCE role; their concern stems
from desires to protect the influence of NATO until the situation in Eastern Europe has
stabilized.
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council and peacekeeping forces capable of maintaining the new European
order. 94 The rest of Europe (especially the French, who are interested in
expanding the security role of the EC; the U.S., which is concerned with the
future of NATO; and Germany, which is preoccupied with the development
of its eastern Lander) may not be willing to agree just yet to the more
far-reaching options proposed for the CSCE. Nevertheless, while hoping
the process evolves into a UN-type confederation, the Scandinavians
appear attuned to the continental Realpolitik. They admit that the CSCE
currently does not offer "a panacea for the problems of Europe." Rather,
the organization gradually could be given "more importance in integrating
the factors of the new security order," an order in which the Swedes and
Finns would have a voice equal, in theory, to the superpowers.95
The Finns, in particular, are placing considerable foreign policy
emphasis on the broad potential of a pan-European security institution.
Finland has considered itself the motive force behind the Helsinki process
from the start, and, in fact, regards the CSCE a part of its "international
identity."96 As was noted previously, the Finns were prepared on several
occasions to offer their good offices to provide a neutral platform for the
superpowers to negotiate their differences. The leadership took the
position that by pursuing a rather singular goal, regional stability, it
could concentrate its diplomatic energies and increase the likelihood of a
94 Peter Wivel, report on interview with Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen,
Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen), 12 May 1990, 2, in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, 21 May 1990, 21-2, and "The Thrill of Europe's Rebirth," 49.
95 Harri Holkeri, "New European Architecture and Finland," an address by the Finnish
Prime Minister at the meeting of the New York Society of International Affairs, New York,
28 September 1990, 3.
9 6 1bid.
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mutually-beneficial settlement. In the complex contemporary arena of
multi-layered security interests, the Finnish government has drawn on its
Cold War experiences to propose some of the most extensive of the
process' long-term objectives. In its view, the threats presented by the
rapidly-evolving paradigm in Europe extend beyond those responsive to
military solutions alone. According to a Finnish Foreign Ministry official,
political means will be given primacy
in developing the prerequisites for security after the Cold War. The
greatest threat to security is not the offensive capability and the intent
of the 'other party,' but the decline in the economic and social position
of the new democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe. 97
The Finns are quick not to belittle the 'military factor' in security. Along
with Sweden and Switzerland, Finland has maintained a respectable
defense force; the theoretical and practical aspects of armed neutrality
demand a credible military deterrent. Nonetheless, the Finnish
government shares the concerns of its Polish and Hungarian counterparts
over the division of Europe, not along military axes, but rather by relative
wealth - in effect, the formation of a "Welfare Wall" to replace the Iron
Curtain.98 The fall of the latter has already led to the de facto partition
of the continent into two unequal economic blocs. The Scandinavians and
the East Europeans argue that, in the absence of an established pan-
European economic system, the CSCE may be the arena to prevent the
97AIpo Rusi, "Changes in Europe: Finland Emphasizes Neutrality in the Military Field;
Foreign Policy Evolving to Non-alignment," quoted from a Foreign Ministry lecture, 20
September 1990, 10. Dr. Rusi is the Director for Planning and Research at the Finnish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
98
"The Thrill of Europe's Rebirth," 50, and Rusi, 10.
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erection of a destabilizing barrier between the 'haves' and 'have nots.'
Placing economics at the pinnacle of the security order would be a
difficult proposition for regional defense planners. However, the
structuring of the new European order demands innovation beyond minor
adjustments to the old paradigm. The proposal that questions of
'economic security' could be settled within the CSCE framework suggests
that there is room to expand the popular definitions of the threat and its
corresponding response. If the CSCE evolves into a European UN, other
issues threatening the continent - such as ethnic migrations and
environmental concerns - quickly could supplant arms control as the
organization's primary focus.
B. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Until most recently, considerations of neutrality and nonalignment
provided the primary impediment to Swedish and Finnish membership in
the EC. In 1970, when the Community offered membership to the
Scandinavian states, both Sweden and Finland opted to remain in the
alternative European Free Trade Association. The issue at that time was
regional concern for the 'Nordic Balance.' 99 The EC was viewed in the-East
as the political and economic arm of the North Atlantic alliance. Moscow
pressured the Nordic neutrals to avoid such a "closed economic
organization" and discounted Nordic claims that political union with
99Kennedy-Minott, Lonely Path to Follow, 51. Sweden and Finland decided not to apply for
EC membership, while Denmark joined, and the Norwegians, after the parliament
approved Norway's application, vetoed membership in a national referendum.
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Western Europe would not follow on the heels of increased trade.' 0 0 The
mild response from Sweden and Finland also reflected the political and
economic impotency of the EC in 1970. Two decades later, the EC is
advertising the forthcoming 'unified Europe,' and the economic pull of the
Community may be irresistible.
In Sweden, the issue of joining the EC has been hotly debated for
years, and it appears that proponents of membership have gained the upper
hand. The Swedes have been members of EFTA since its establishment in
1959. While ties between the EC and EFTA have ben relatively loose over
the years, the creation of the European Economic Space in the summer of
1989 was a significant step toward removing remaining trade barriers.
Since then, the tremendous changes in Central Europe have made the EES
more of a waiting room that a gateway to cooperative action. Growing
concern among EFTA members over the economic impact of the European
Community's goal of a single market in 1992 already has led Austria to
submit its application for membership. Swedish business concerns,
fearing the 'Fortress Europe' scenario, have pushed the government toward
the EC. One Scandinavian official echoed business' enthusiasm for the
single market when he forecasted that "the EC will be the dynamo and the
powerhouse in the Europe of the future.. .(and) that in ten years' time we
will have a Europe in which the nucleus of European development will be
the EC."101
10 0 AIlison, 121-6 and Berner, 116-7. Apparently, the Soviets were very concerned
that an increase in Swedish and Finnish trade with the West would necessitate a drop in
commerce with the COMECON countries.
0 Terkel Svensson, report on interview with Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-
Jensen, Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen), 4 February 1990, 6, in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, 26 January 1990, 23.
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While some voices both in and out of the EC may be overestimating the
near-term potential of the Community, the fact remains that the
collective economic and political clout of the twelve-member
organization is formidable and still growing. Swedish insistence on
nonalignment should not be so determined as to isolate the country in the
midst of an emerging 'common European home.' Certainly, there would be
political costs to EC membership. Sweden would have to give up some
freedom of political and economic maneuver in the name of collective
policy. This price until now has been too high for a country that has an
independent foreign policy as a traditional vital interest. Pierre Sch6ri, a
leading voice in the Swedish Foreign Ministry, succinctly described a
generation of unease between Sweden's position on nonalignment and
membership in the West European economic organization:
Sweden's armed neutrality is an all-weather policy. It is not an end in
itself but it has served us well in keeping this country out of war for
more than 175 years .... Our neutrality from the superpower blocs ensures
we can remain an independent, mediating force in the world. You can see
this with our role in helping achieve a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war
and in efforts to bring the U.S. and the Palestine Liberation Organization
together. Could you really see a member of the EC being able to do all
that? 10 2
However, in less than a year, the Swedish government completely reversed
its position on EC membership. As recently as Fall 1990, the Swedes were
not prepared to commit to the European Community as the only alternative
102Bo Stenstrom, report on interview with the Swedish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary
of State Pierre Sch6ri, Helsinki Hufvudstadsbladet, 23 November 1990, 8, in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, 23 February 1990, 23.
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for economic integration. 103 Then, in a move that left its Nordic
counterparts stunned and isolated, the Swedish parliament voted on 12
December to give the prime minister the mandate to apply for membership
to the EC. Both the Norwegians and the Finns called such a move
premature and reacted angrily to the Swedish government's failure to
consult with its Nordic neighbors prior to announcing its decision to seek
the mandate. 104 Yet another element in the unfolding EC drama is the
European Community itself. The EC Commission, which oversees new
applications, has declared that it will accept no additional members until
at least 1993.105
The Finns have shown little enthusiasm for rushing their application
for EC membership. Irritated by what it considered Sweden's failure to
observe regional interests, Finland intends to continue to move cautiously
on the issue of European integration. In the short term, the Finns are
planning to work within EFTA and to assist in bilateral negotiations with
the EC through the European Economic Space. According to the Prime
Minister Holkeri, the government will concentrate on completing EES
arrangements before taking additional steps toward the EC. 06 The
103
-Carlsson's Tiny Distance," Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), 2 July 1990, 2, in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, 18 September 1990, 56.
104
-Sweden to Seek Membership in the European Community," New York Times, 13
December 1990, 4, and John Burton, "Nordic States Disagree on EC," Financial Times(London), 1 November 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 2 November
1990, 18-9.
10 5Burton, 19. The vice-chairman of the EC Commission added that the Community was
prepared to accept a joint Nordic application with an entry date of 1994.
1 06 Jan-Anders Ekstrom, "Finland Puts its Money on the European Economic Space,"
Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm), 28 October 1990, 8, in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, 2 November 1990, 25.
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government is primarily concerned with the impact 'Europeanization' will
have on domestic economics and foreign policy. Although the Finnish
leadership realizes that most of the economic implications of integration
would be favorable to the country, some of the state's leading financial
concerns and interest groups worry that a 'Europe first' policy would
loosen their hold on the domestic economy.108 The government intends to
use the EES negotiations as an adjustment period - one that will allow the
Finnish economy to restructure along the lines of the EC program. The
Finnish move is designed to distance domestic policy from European
scrutiny during the restructuring phase; by taking such an unobtrusive
approach to integration with the rest of the continent, Finland hopes to
avoid both EC and domestic pressures for quick, destabilizing reforms. 109
Like the Swedes, the Finns are concerned as well with the
implications of EC membership on their respective foreign policies. Some
circles within the European Community are discussing the possibility of
extending the organization's role to security matters - possibly through a
revived Western European Union (WEU). 11o Finland is watching these
developments closely; since the EC remains a West European 'club,' a
108 Humphreys, 27. According to Humphreys, "The real difference is that the EC both
prevents and restrains major concentrations of economic power, while Finland does
neither." The argument for the cartel system was that, for a small country like Finland to
survive against its much larger international competition, such a concentration of power
was necessary. Domestic economic power blocs are found still in the financial, chemical,
building materials, and electronics industries. Naturally, these businesses remain
reluctant to support the government's efforts to deregulate.
1091bid., 28-44, and Burton, 18-9.
1 1 oWilfred Gruber, The Future of Europe's Security (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
Fcruary 1990, 9-10, and Rusi, 11. Gruber notes that the Single European Act of 1985,
the document which codified the EC1992 goals, explicitly excluded a military role for the
EC in security affairs.
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security function for the organization could, in theory, be opposed to the
interests of Finland's closest neighbor. From Finland's point of view, the
regional Realpolitik requires that the Soviet Union must not be isolated in
the new European order, and the Finnish government admits that it will
not sacrifice its security-related neutrality policy to the integration
process.1 11 Therein lies the reason for the Finns' efforts to formalize the
security functions of the CSCE process.
Sweden and Finland have been accused of wanting 'Europe' / la
carte.1 12 Certainly, both countries must ensure that their national
interests are served. Nevertheless, if the Nordic neutrals are willing to
take the benefits coincident to EC membership, they also must be prepared
to give a little, as well, and not insist on special privileges or conditions.
With over 54% of Swedish and almost half of Finnish international trade
involving the EC, both countries already have surrendered a certain amount
of economic sovereignty. 113 Yet, even though EFTA and the EES have
assisted in adjusting the Nordic economies to EC rules, Sweden and
Finland will have little influence in the Brussels decisionmaking process
so long as they remain outside of 'Europe.' All in all, the lessening of
East-West tensions and the economic advantages offered by the EC should
give Stockholm and Helsinki the added impetus to review its future role in
a pan-European political and economic framework.
111 Rusi, 11. The author points out that in the Persian Gulf, Finland is not a neutral.
Rather, it supports collective security among UN members based on consenual agreements.
112Sverker Astram, "The Nordic Angle 1: Sweden's EC Dilemmas," The World Today,
November 1988, 192.
113 international Monetary Fund, 176-8 and 368-70.
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VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Sweden and Finland appear ready to alter the nature of their
respective neutrality/nonalignment policies. The end of the Cold War has
forced the Nordic neutrals to review the objectives of their traditional
foreign policy stance. Both countries had pursued a deliberate, legalistic
process to obtain international recognition of its neutrality. Sweden's
efforts allowed it to chart a course independent of the superp: vers, while
establishing itself as a model for small nations seeking political freedom
in the Cold War. In Finland's case, international acceptance of its
nonalignment created the conditions whereby a democratic nation could
coexist peacefully on the borders of the most powerful communist state.
Yet, in a remarkably short period of time, the Swedes and Finns have begun
to change the nature and extent of their foreign policies to accommodate
the new political climate swept in by the European revolutions of 1989.
Neither country is preparing to dismiss its declared neutral status.
Rather, both are attempting to resolve the paradox in their foreign policy
by shaping neutrality to fit their interests in the emerging world order. It
appears that Sweden and Finland have chosen two European collective
organizations, the EC and CSCE, as the primary instruments of political,
economic, and security policy in the next decade.
Sweden has taken the lead in Nordic foreign policy with its recent
move toward the EC and European integration. An ailing economy and
impotence against repeated violations of its territory by foreign
submarines have required Sweden to take the initiative to seek new
alternatives for its national and regional interests. Consequently, the
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Swedes have chosen Europe without waiting for consensus with its more
cautious neighbors. The early move signals that the country will be less
reluctant to accept the EC without preconditions - and perhaps, without
the 4 la carte menu on security matters that had been the major stumbling
block to membership application.
This Europe initiative leaves Sweden's security dilemma unresolved.
Reflecting on national policy at the height of the submarine intrusions,
Anders Bj6rck, a conservative member of parliament noted that Sweden
"has had 170 years with no war, a high standard of living, a quiet country
with a welfare state. That tends to make you less suspicious than you
should be."1 13 He also might have added that so long a period of peace may
cast doubts on the credibility of the nation's defense. The results of the
last decade support this perspective. Stockholm's compromising and
conciliatory response to Soviet transgressions far from embarrassing
Moscow has instead been an embarrassment to Swedish foreign policy.
The result for the Soviets has certainly been a loss of international
prestige; for Sweden, however, the damage may have been much more
extensive. Regardless of the impact of the East-West entente cordiale,
Sweden's vaunted armed neutrality posture has been br;ached, and
therefore its credibility as a deterrent weakened. The Swedes must look
then to the pan-European collective security arrangements evolving on the
continent. Of these, the COSCE holds the greatest promise for giving
Sweden a voice in European security affairs and for restoring a measure of
credibility to the country's defense guarantee.
113 Kruzel, 542.
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The Finns are content with a more cautious approach to their
integ ,tion with the post-Cold War Europe. More than any other European
state, Finland has followed a balanced course in East-West relations.
Politically, economically, and socially the country is a self-contained
Western democracy. Yet, its relations with its Soviet neighbor have
remained positive and reflect the range of the two countries' mutual
interests. Finland also benefits from a broad domestic consensus marked
by an unusual degree of long-term consistency.114 The Finnish government
lacks the dramatic political divisions typical of the European
parliamentary systems. Consequently, the Finns are prepared to ride out
the post-Cold War shock waves and wait for the politico-military
situation in the Soviet Union to stabilize before ardently moving toward
Europe. Even so, and like Sweden, Finland will maneuver its neutralist
foreign policy to adjust to the changing world order. As Finnish diplomat
Max Jakobson has noted, however, the country's neutrality policy "is
designed to resolve the latent conflict between ideological ties and
strategic realities inherent in the country's situation .... [Finland] must base
her security on an unsentimental calculation of national interest."115 This
approach will continue to reflect an adherence to the regional Realpolitik
that has been the mainstay of Finnish policy in the postwar period. The
CSCE process represents the best forum to ensure Finland's voice in
continental security affairs within the neutralist framework. At the
114Pertti Paasio, Finnish Foreign Minister, in an address to the Finnish Parliament,
Helsinki, 18 September 1990, 4. The lack of drama in Finnish politics might be
attributed to the fact that the liberal and conservative parties have formed a majority
coalition.
1 Sjakobson, 99, and Bitzinger, Neutrality for Eastern Europe?, 11.
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same time, EC-EES negotiations will remain at the top of the country's
economic agenda.
Consequently, the Nordic neutrals are at a crossroads in defining their
foreign policy for the 1990s. Decisions made in Stockholm and Helsinki
likely will be guided by historical ties to Scandinavia and a long tradition
of successful nonalignment. Yet, with the door opening to the East and a
continent-wide dash to grab a seat at the new European roundtable,
isolation under the banner of neutrality would be the wrong path to
choose. The historic paradigm shift now enveloping Europe confronts the
national actors with a host of security problems beyond the scope of a
military response. The new Europe must negotiate an obstacle course of
political issues, such as massive population movements caused by an
imbalance in continental economic and social conditions, and far-reaching
environmental concerns. The Nordic neutrals, as nonaligned observers in
the old paradigm, are situated to present progressive, unfettered guidance
to the emerging European collective structures. Sweden and Finland
should take this initiative to embrace their European neighbors as charter
members of the new order.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U. S. SECURITY POLICY
The paper up to this point has drawn conclusions as to the likely
structure of Nordic nonalignment/neutrality policies in the upcoming
decade. The final section introduces the possible policy implications for
the United States based on these findings. A critical element in ensuring
that American interests are protected in the new European order is the
policymaker's understanding not only of the concept of 'Europe,' but also of
the regional and national intricacies that are part of the whole. A
comprehensive 'European solution' would be an unsatisfactory approach for
U.S. policy. Nevertheless, the continent remains an area of vital national
interest - perhaps, even survival interest - for a myriad of security,
political, and economic reasons. 116 Consequently, American policy should
pursue a vigorous approach to bilateral relations with both the collective
organizations, such as the EC, and the smaller littoral states, bearing in
mind that national interests among the U.S. and its negotiating partners do
not represent a zero-sum relationship.
The most significant issue facing U.S. interests in Europe is the
continued threat posed by superpower military competition. There is
little doubt that this threat is receding. 117 The spread of democracy
throughout Eastern and Central Europe, the unification of Germany, and
unprecedented success in conventional arms (CFE) and confidence-building
116Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted (Lexington, Kentucky: University of
Kentucky Press, 1985), 10.
1 17
"Final Communiqu6," Min arial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry,
UK, 7-8 June 1990, quoted in NATO Review, June 1990, 30.
71
(CSBM) negotiations are indicative of the positive trends in improving
East-West relations. However, as the NATO foreign ministers noted in
June of this year,
such a fundamental process of change carries with it its own potential
for instability and uncertainty. In addition, even after the satisfactory
conclusion of current arms control negotiations, the Soviet Union will
continue to retain substantial, modern and effective nuclear and
conventional forces.1 18
The NATO communiqud is a stark reminder that even as the West extends
an olive branch to the East, the Alliance is wary of the Soviet potential to
threaten the existence of its members. For the northern NATO states, and
the U.S. as the predominant seapower, the Norwegian, Barents, and Baltic
Seas remain areas of special interest to Alliance security. In addition,
the northern states realize that the reduction in tensions in Central
Europe - including the far-reaching troop withdrawals in Germany and
Hungary - has not lowered the military capability of Soviet forces on the
Kola Peninsula, or in the remainder of the Leningrad or Baltic Military
Districts. 1 19 For the near term, therefore, the Nordic region will remain
an object of superpower competition.
Sweden and Finland will be caught in the middle between the nuclear
powers until the reasons for this competition are removed. Since the
Nordic neutrals are outside the alliance structures, their policy positions
are often ignored or slighted. However, the U.S./NATO shares a common
1181bid., 31, quoted from the "Defence Planning Committee Final Communique" section of
the ministerial meeting report.
119Kennedy-Minott, Lonely Path to Follow, 39. See also The Military Balance in
Northern Europe 1989-1990, a report from the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Oslo,
1990.
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interest with Sweden and Finland in regional stability. The challenge for
the regional actors is to minimize the instability brought on by the
dramatic changes in East-West relations. Toward this end, the U.S. must
recognize the distinctive character of Swedish and Finnish national
interests and negotiate with the two neutrals with a mutual
understanding of the common goal. The U.S. and its NATO allies should
reassure the Nordic neutrals that regional security would be served best
in the current period of uncertainty by a combination of superpower
dialogue and a credible deterrent force. The Swedes and Finns have been
concerned in the past that one or the other superpower may upset the
delicate balance in the North and violate their neutrality in the process.
The NNWFZ concept, for example, is an outgrowth of attempts to reconcile
their worries. If the U.S., in particular, wishes to enhance its strategic
position in the region, it must address the unique foreign policy concerns
of Sweden and Finland, and not approach the two countries as part of a
'generic' Europe. Specifically, (1) NATO (primarily the U.S. Navy) and the
Nordic states should reach an agreement expressing a common policy on
NNWFZ; (2) the U.S. should realize the inevitable potential of the CSCE
process and improve its working relationships with Sweden and Finland to
achieve 'Arctic Stability'; (3) Washington should increase bilateral
economic relations with the Nordic states before EC membership
preparations become all-consuming; and (4) the U.S. policymakers might
find it useful to absorb some of the 'lessons learned' by the Swedes and
Finns on practical relations with the Soviets. The Nordic region is merely
one piece in the complex puzzle facing the United States as it attem '
adjust to a rapidly-developing, new European order. Yet, through a
coordinated proactive diplomatic effort and increased emphasis on the
73
unique nature of Nordic policy, Washington may have the opportunity to
resolve at least the northern flank of the puzzle.
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